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ASSISTANT SECRETARY
FOR ADMINISTRATION
MR. PEURIFOY

MAY 26 1948

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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1. Mr. Hutton
2. Mr. Peurifoy

May 24, 1948

MEMORANDUM FOR: A - Mr. John E. Peurifoy
Through: OBP - William O. Hall
Subject: Modification of Survey Report Resulting from
Conference between Robinson, CON and Armstrong, R

As a result of a counterproposal of CON and a conference with Mr. Robinson and Mr. Armstrong, it is suggested that the following modifications of the survey report be approved. These modifications have the approval of R and CON.

CON will continue its responsibility for "domestic" or internal U. S. security operations and will retain the necessary liaison channels with the civilian agencies, i.e., Treasury, Justice, and Post Office (excluding CIA).

CON will establish a small security clearance center which will be responsible for security action and operations with respect to U. S. citizens and foreigners within U. S. borders. This security clearance center will also be responsible for security action and operations with respect to U. S. citizens and aliens abroad in connection with repatriation passports, visas and other cases involving the movement into the United States of persons expected to cause internal difficulties.

CON will maintain an index file on foreign agents in the U. S. (required by the Foreign Agent Registration Act) but will maintain biographic files only on U. S. nationals; biographic files on foreigners will be maintained in BI.

R will receive all "foreign" security operations and liaison with CIA, Army, Navy and Air Force except for CON's responsibility for physical and personnel security of U. S. Missions abroad.

Although the formal liaison channels will be established as indicated above, the CON area will develop relationships at the working level as necessary with their opposite numbers in the domestic and internal security sections of the Military and CIA, and the R area will develop working relations as necessary with their opposite numbers on foreign intelligence with the civilian agencies.

R will be responsible for collection, evaluation, and dissemination of all information originating from foreign sources. R area will handle all operational intelligence matters except security matters in which civilian agencies or the divisions of CON are involved or required to take action, for example, visa cases, munitions, protective services, etc.

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R will get all files of FC except those files on U. S. nationals. The transferred files will include the FC master index file, the files of German Nazis, the ESP file, the war relocation file on Japanese, Neisi, etc.

On problems similar to the Dominican Republic revolution and the Bogota incident, the R area will provide all information, reports, and data to the political areas of the Department and will arrange to have CON notify its divisions who would be required to take action. The R area would also be responsible for informing the CON liaison man when action is required of the civilian agencies.

S/O
Stanley T. Orear, Chief
Division of Organization and Budget

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April 29, 1948

MEMORANDUM FOR: A - Mr. Peurifoy

Attached is a survey of R, FC, EUR/X and transmittal letter from Mr. Orear. I agree with the recommendations contained in the report insofar as they relate to the consolidation under a single direction of the Research and Intelligence Offices and the Division of Foreign Activity Correlation. On the basis of reading this report, my judgment would be that the consolidation should include EUR/X in order to insure one intelligence operation to avoid any possible duplication.

In addition to the recommendations contained in the report, I would urge strongly that the head of the new intelligence operation should adopt a more vigorous and active policy with respect to bringing to the attention of appropriate officials of the Department information which may be of assistance to them. This will be particularly essential if FC and EUR/X become part of the general intelligence operation.

In considering the study, I would particularly suggest that you scan the materials contained under tab "Exhibit A" as indicating the conscientious effort on the part of individuals in the several Divisions to reconcile their disagreements. On the whole, it appears that these efforts have not been particularly successful.

If you approve the general recommendation above, there are a number of additional steps necessary to place the proposed organization change in effect. I will request the staff to proceed with these additional steps if we have your concurrence.

Wm. Hall

William O. Hall, Director
Office of Budget and Planning

Attachment

OBP:WCHall:gr

ASSISTANT SECRETARY
FOR ADMINISTRATION
MR. PEURIFOY

APR 30 1948

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

*Approved 5/3/48
Mr. Hall Lalk
with Mr. Peurifoy*

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Survey Report

on

INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATIONS
IN THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Prepared by
The Division of Organization and Budget

Fred W. Darnell
John H. Moore

April 27, 1948


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Exhibit A - Documents Relating to Attempts to Resolve Intelligence Conflicts

Exhibit B - Survey of Division of Foreign Activity Correlation

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SUMMARY

Survey Report on Intelligence Organizations in the Department of State

Problem: To determine whether the present functional assignments and operations in the intelligence field on the part of the Special Assistant for Research and Intelligence (R), the Division of Foreign Activity Correlation (FC), and the Special Assistant to the Office of European Affairs (EUR/X) either (1) constitute duplication in terms of personal services, (2) result in non-coverage of important intelligence matters, or (3) provide the most effective service to the Department.

Background: At the Budget Bureau hearings in October, 1947, witnesses from R and the Office of Controls (CON) testified that they were not sufficiently informed to be able to answer questions from the examiners as to whether or not duplication existed in the work of R, FC, and EUR/X. The Budget Officer then promised that the matter would be investigated, and the Assistant Secretary for Administration (A) requested that the investigation also cover the more important problem of completeness of coverage of intelligence material.

Two OS representatives, Fred Darnell and John Moore, were assigned to this task, have surveyed the three areas, and have prepared this report.

Conclusions:

1. There is a small amount of duplication between R and FC in terms of personal services.
2. Although the Department as a whole has a complete coverage of intelligence data from all known sources, each of the three groups gets a small amount of data which is not made available to the other two.
3. The Department's attempt to split intelligence work into separate fields of "security" and "positive" intelligence has not been successful. Consequently, the policy officers of the Department have to rely upon fragmentary "security" intelligence reports and "positive" research intelligence reports which are incomplete because they do not make the best use of the existing resources of personnel and data.
4. EUR/X serves more as a political advisor than as an intelligence unit.

Recommendations:

1. The entire intelligence function should be assigned to the R area, - the necessary supplementing of that organization to provide for prompt, efficient, and completely informed action on security action matters.
2. FC should be disbanded as a Division and its functions and personnel attached to the R area in a new pattern.

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3. EUR/X should remain attached to EUR, strengthened by the addition of an Assistant and required to establish a clearance channel with the R area on matters of joint concern.
4. Certain positive steps be taken to improve the working relations between the R area and the policy officers of the Department.


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Narrative Report

I. Introduction

This survey was begun on November 27 as a result of a discussion which developed in the Bureau of the Budget hearings in October pursuant to testimony to the effect that the employees of R, FC, and EUR/X were not familiar with the work done by each other group. The Bureau of the Budget pointed out that they had raised the same question the year before, but that no action had been taken by the Department. It was agreed at that point by the Budget Officer and the Assistant Secretary for Administration to conduct a survey to determine (1) whether any duplication existed in the work of these three groups, and (2) whether lack of close working relationships resulted in a non-coverage of any important intelligence data.

At the same time, in response to a request from the Director of CON, a management survey was made in FC, involving interviews with almost every employee and an examination of its records and procedures. The special report on the FC part of this larger survey, pointing out certain internal operational problems, was completed January 20 and furnished the Director of CON and the Chief of FC. (See Exhibit B)

In the R area, interviews were confined to the Special Assistant for Research and Intelligence, his immediate staff, Office Directors and Deputies, Division Chiefs and Assistants, and Branch Chiefs, except in those areas in which duplication or conflict appeared to occur, in which case the interviewing coverage was expanded. Records and procedures were not examined in detail except in those areas where duplication or conflict appeared evident. In EUR/X the Special Assistant in charge of the unit was the only person interviewed, but the information obtained was checked with two political Office Directors and a number of other persons in the political area, some of whom had formerly served in the EUR/X area.

Several interviews were held in DC, not only with the Division Chief and his assistants, but with a number of the employees in the mail-opening room, the Telegraph Branch, the Records Branch, and the Liaison Branch, in order to check the quantity and type of intelligence material furnished to each intelligence group and to determine whether any group had exclusive sources of such data.

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I. Description of Each Area Surveyed

A. Research and Intelligence Area (R)

1. General. The largest area is that headed by the Special Assistant for Research and Intelligence, including two offices, eight divisions, and 520 persons. These employees are engaged primarily in collecting, reviewing, and analyzing intelligence data of all sorts and producing research intelligence studies in political, economic and sociological fields for the benefit of end users elsewhere in this Department and in other Federal agencies.

The functional field assigned to this area is that of "positive" intelligence, and includes the use of all types of materials from the representatives abroad of State, CIA, and the military establishments, as well as foreign official and private reports, documents, maps, newspapers, pamphlets and other publications. Based on such data, studies are prepared on past and present political, economic or sociological trends in particular countries or geographic areas, including the prediction of future trends and events. These studies are used by the political and other officers of the Department to aid in the determination of present and future foreign policy decisions with respect to particular political or economic problems.

Although hasty "spot" reports are made upon request, the usual product is more lengthy report in which the full context is provided for the particular subject of discussion.

2. Office of Intelligence Collection and Dissemination (OCD). OCD is composed of three Divisions, the Intelligence Acquisition and Distribution Division (IAD), the Biographic Information Division (BI), and the Intelligence Reference Division (REF).

The Intelligence Acquisition and Distribution Division, with 36 employees, maintains a Procurement Branch which conducts liaison activities with the Central Intelligence Agency and the military establishments for the purpose of securing copies of regular and special intelligence documents which the R area needs for the conduct of research and intelligence activities. The liaison officers employed in this Branch call upon many identical persons in the four other agencies who are also called upon by liaison officers from FC seeking copies of the same material. In the case of State and Army reading panels, panel members from IAD and FC sit side by side reading identical material and occasionally substituting for each other. Not only does IAD collect a greater quantity and more varied types of intelligence data from some of the same agencies as FC, but in addition it is engaged in procurement on a large scale of Foreign Government and private publications, books, pamphlets, newspapers and periodicals.

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The Division of Biographic Information, with 54 employees, is segmented on a geographic area basis, each country expert maintaining a large set of card files, cross-indexed alphabetically and by categories of activity or employment. These card files for each country are established on a standard pattern providing for the determination of the names of heads of national, regional and municipal governments, members of legislatures, police officers, political leaders, members of trade, professional and other groups, etc. In addition to the index cards, files are maintained containing copies of telegrams, airgrams, reports, dispatches, newspaper clippings, magazine articles, etc., containing biographic information on each individual person (FC maintains only a card file indicating available sources of biographic data on individuals). BI does not build its file on the basis of individual requests, but continuously develops on its own initiative as much information as possible on all important persons in any country. The Intelligence Reference Division, with 54 employees, receives, develops and maintains the Department's central collection of positive intelligence materials. This mass of material is cataloged and classified by type and geographic area and forms a working or reference file which can meet the informational requirements of the substantive officers of the Department. The group provides an information service which upon request collects all reference material available on any subject and provides the raw data to the analysts both in OIR and the rest of the Department.

3. Office of Intelligence Research (OIR). OIR is composed of five divisions: The Division of Research for Europe (DRE), Division of Research for American Republics (DRA), Division of Research for Far East (DRF), Division of Research for Near East and Africa (DRN), and Division of International and Functional Intelligence (IFI), and employs 325 persons. These divisions are staffed by country or area experts in the political, sociological, and economic fields who read, evaluate, and file the material secured for them by the Acquisition and Distribution Division (IAD), and produce research reports and surveys on their own initiative or at the request of the political and other areas of the Department, or other agencies of the Government. These divisions are staffed by persons who have expert knowledge of an economic field or of a country to which they are assigned and who in addition have special facility in the languages of these countries.

These groups evaluate the intelligence materials, analyze trends and tendencies, and develop background data for the purpose of preparing intelligence research studies, situation reports, and spot intelligence reports for use by the policy officers in the Department.

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In addition, these divisions work closely with their counterparts in CIA and the military intelligence agencies in the development of joint studies and projects. Some examples of major reports which would be prepared in these divisions are: - Potential Economic Contribution of Netherlands East Indies to the European Recovery Program, - The First Year of the European Communism, - The Politics and Personnel of the Socialist Party in Italy.

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B. Division of Foreign Activity Correlation (FC)

1. General. FC is one of the six Divisions in the Office of Controls and presently employs 66 persons. In addition to the Office of the Chief, there is a Liaison group, a Security Name Check group, a Security Evaluation group, and an Administrative group. These employees are engaged primarily in collecting, reviewing and analyzing intelligence data in order to discover incidents with respect to persons, organizations, or situations which indicate present or future danger to the interests of the United States.

In some instances, the data is provided to other parts of the Department for action to be taken; for example the issuance or refusal of a visa or passport. In other instances, after appropriate review and clearance by the political officer, the senior officers of FC initiate positive action on the part of other Divisions and other Departments to provide for the security of U. S. interests. To illustrate, in the event FC receives through intelligence channels information suggesting the possibility of a revolution in a particular country, FC would arrange (1) with the Passport Division to prevent the issuance of passports to American citizens desirous of enlisting in the revolutionary forces; (2) with the Munitions Division to prevent any violation of U.S. laws with respect to the export of arms and ammunition to the revolutionary forces; (3) with the Visa Division to prevent aliens from entering the U.S. who are likely to make illegal purchases of arms and ammunition or recruit soldiers of fortune; (4) with DS to arrange for plans for the protection of U. S. citizens and their interests including their possible evacuation and repatriation. In addition, (5) FC would keep the political officers informed, (6) arrange to secure as much additional information as possible from the Central Intelligence Agency and from the intelligence arms of the military services, (7) and would arrange for cooperative action on the part of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Treasury Secret Service and Customs, and the Post Office Department. (The R area would be carrying on duplicating action in the case of items (5) and (6)).

The functional field assigned to this area is that of "security" intelligence, involving the use of data on both overt and covert activities of individuals and organizations. Frequently such data is fragmentary in nature and undependable as to source, but by its very nature it is of a character that it must be used speedily if it is to be used at all. To illustrate, if a rumor originating from an unreliable source and received through an intelligence agency is to the effect that an attempt will be made to assassinate an important foreign personage visiting the Secretary of State on the following day, there is neither time nor opportunity to check the reliability of the report and the decision must be made immediately whether or not to arrange for special protective measures.

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The reason FC was placed in the Office of Controls was that it appeared proper to do so in view of the basic plan to have one Office the focal point for all security matters in the Department of State. The other divisions in the Office of Controls are the chief end-users of the name-check reports prepared by FC, and these divisions work cooperatively with FC on plans and action programs involving security, since each one of them has jurisdiction over an activity which concerns a security phase of the work of the Department.

FC was the only Division in the Department covering intelligence matters until the Office of Strategic Services was transferred to the Department of State. FC's Liaison Branch is the outgrowth of the old U-L staff group attached to the Under Secretary's office and at that time was the exclusive liaison channel with the intelligence areas of the military establishments.

2. Liaison Group. The Liaison group conducts liaison activities with the intelligence areas of the Departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force and Central Intelligence Agency for the purpose of securing copies of regular and special intelligence documents FC or other elements of the Department need to determine what security action must be taken to protect the interests of the United States. This group also conducts liaison activities with the Justice Department, Treasury Department, and other civilian agencies involved with security and law enforcement activities, including exclusive liaison with the Federal Bureau of Investigation. In addition, this group engages in active liaison activities with the military agencies on matters relating to military and naval attaches at foreign posts and the handling of all special problems arising from civil or criminal acts and breaches of the peace on the part of members of the armed forces in foreign countries. This group acts as the channel for representation by the Department of State to the military agencies on a large variety of routine administrative matters.

A former sub-unit of this group, now attached to the Office of the Chief of FC, negotiates agreements with local representatives of foreign nations with respect to the establishment of military training missions and arranges with the military establishments for the staffing of such missions.

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3. Security Name Check Group. The Security Name Check group responds to requests from within or without the Department for information with respect to persons or organizations concerning which some doubt has arisen from a security standpoint, as to the propriety of taking a certain action, for example, the issuance of a passport or visa, or the clearance of a conference delegate. This group checks with all other agencies within and without the Department likely to have data on the person or organization, borrows their files, and produces a brief informational or biographical sketch which is furnished the inquirer. On inquiries arising within the Department, FC makes recommendations as to the action to be taken.
4. Security Evaluation Group. This group of analysts reviews airgrams, telegrams, reports, and dispatches secured by the Liaison group with a view to detecting items indicating present or probable activity on the part of a person or group which is or may be inimical to the interests of the United States. These fragmentary items are brought to the attention of the appropriate political offices and if clearance is given, the senior officers of FC will then prosecute a security action program, as described previously in this report. These analysts, in reviewing the flow of documents, are responsible for adding names and references to the master security index file.
5. Administrative Group. In addition to handling the usual personnel, budget, travel, mail and file, and like items, this group also maintains the master index file of persons against which the security checks are made. This group also carries out the function of providing a secondary screening of information copies of telegrams and airgrams furnished by the Department of State to Army, Navy, Air Force and FBI.

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C. Special Assistant to Office of European Affairs (EUR/X)

The EUR/X group differs from the R and FC groups in that it acts as a political adviser whose concern is limited primarily to communism and fascism, and more specifically to the political implications of these movements internally in the United States and in other countries. For example: the group is concerned with the infiltration of Communists and their theories into national and international labor groups. The group is small, comprising one Special Assistant to the Director of EUR, three P-3 analysts, and three clerical employees.

They receive information copies of telegrams, airgrams, reports and despatches duplicating those received by R and FC on the subjects with which EUR/X is concerned. EUR/X also receives private reports from a few persons abroad who have been trained to be expert reporters on these subjects during former assignments under the direction of the head of this unit. These reports, while few in number, are considered to be quite valuable and their dissemination is narrowly restricted in the Department, being available at present only to the Special Assistant for Research and Intelligence, the political Office Directors, and a selected group of political desk officers (Not to FC).

The Special Assistant in charge of this unit has for 25 years devoted his entire time and energy to the problem of communism and its political implications. His acquaintance with informed persons on this subject both in the U. S. and abroad is perhaps the largest of any person in Government, and his memory with respect to persons and incidents is phenomenal. This man, together with such assistants as have been available to him, has always been attached to one or another of the political Divisions or Offices since the beginning of the activity. The Special Assistant not only reviews material and proffers political advice, but joins with officers of the Department in a vigorous prosecution of action supporting American foreign policy. This is done in part through private anti-communist persons and groups in the U. S. and abroad.

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Duplication and Conflict

Duplication does exist clearly in a few instances in terms of personal services. Both IAD and FC employ reading panel members who review identical material at the panels in State and Army. Both Divisions have liaison officers calling upon identical persons in the Central Intelligence Agency, Army, Navy, and Air Force (exclusive of administrative matters). The basic purpose of the panel review and liaison activity is to secure or promote the flow of intelligence material to end-users in the Department. The collections made by the panel members frequently differ, as do the purposes for which the liaison officers make some of their calls.

There is little duplication between the files of BI and FC since the latter does not build up files upon the persons reported upon, but merely indicates on the master index cards the sources from which information is available. However, since BI is responsible for developing card and file records on every important person in a country, including political figures, professional persons, party leaders, labor leaders, etc., and since FC is endeavoring to build its master index to cover every person who is presently engaged in or likely to engage in covert subversive acts which are inimical to the United States, it is obvious that there will be an increase in the trend to cover the same persons in both Divisions.

A tremendous number of duplicate items, including those secured by the liaison officers of IAD and FC, are reviewed and analyzed by personnel of both Divisions. According to the present functional assignments in the Department the persons so engaged are conducting liaison, review and analysis from wholly different points of view. FC's point of view is that of "Security" intelligence which includes covert and overt acts or information of a security nature, whereas BI's point of view is that of "political" intelligence and also includes all overt or public acts and pertinent covert acts. Since many persons, organizations, and political situations do not fall exclusively into one or the other category, duplicate coverage is inevitable. This is exemplified by the reports prepared upon persons and organizations in the "curtain" countries, where everyone in a position of importance, political or otherwise, is clearly of interest to the positive intelligence group, while at the same time the fact that these persons are important in a Communist-dominated country is a clear indication of their close ties to subversive groups presumed to be of inimical interest to the United States.

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The conflict of jurisdiction illustrated in the preceding paragraph is a far greater problem than duplication, and is the basis of the constant struggle which has gone on since the R and FC areas were established separately in the Department. Theoretically, the intelligence field of R was limited to "positive" intelligence, while that of FC was limited to "security" intelligence. Neither area was to engage in "counter-" intelligence in the sense of employing undercover agents and reporters. At the time these functional assignments were made, the Assistant Secretary for Administration recognized that frequent conflicts might arise, and requested that the two groups work together to develop working agreements to define and delimit their respective responsibilities. Many attempts have been made, both orally and in writing, (See Exhibit A) but the problem is not resolved and is not likely to be resolved as long as two organizations exist separately in the field of intelligence.

It would appear that attempts to segregate "security" intelligence from "positive" intelligence are futile, and that the Department should now abandon the artificial distinction which has been made in the past. Both R and FC use approximately the same sources and the same intelligence data, and provide service to the other elements of the Department. R uses the intelligence data to prepare full reports on general and frequently long-range trends in political groups, FC prepares reports and acts upon the fragmentary bit of information indicating that the long-range trend has "come to a boil" and that a crisis is imminent. R cannot produce a complete report on such a subject without covering the "covert" phases of activity; FC cannot produce a complete "security" report without covering the "overt" factors. Revolutions or peaceful changes in foreign governments effecting U. S. interests do not occur without prior activities on the part of individuals and groups over a considerable period of time. The studies and reports on the persons and groups involved in these situations should be timely and complete, including both overt and covert activities. To separate "positive" intelligence from "security" intelligence, both of which involve collection, study, and operations, is to create deliberately an obstacle to the preparation of complete and integrated reports.

The problems which arise from the jurisdictional difficulties inherent in the maintenance of two intelligence organizations in the Department are not limited to the areas themselves, but affect other areas of the Department and other Federal agencies as well. The Passport Division may know it should ask FC for a security name check, and the Aviation Division may know it should ask DRA for a report on South American air transportation systems, but the political officer cannot be sure whether he should call FC or RI for a report on a Bolivian Gelegate to an international conference in the United States, and Army Intelligence Division does not know whether to call R or FC, or both with respect to a proposed meeting of attaches in Frankfurt.

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Furthermore, outside agencies in their search for material will play one Departmental area against the other in trying to get restricted information. For example, an intelligence agency requested the Wedemeyer report of the R area, and when informed that it was not available, they made a second attempt by requesting it of FC, and in this case were refused.

Such problems will continue inevitably until such time as all intelligence activities of the Department are brought under one head.


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IV. Non-Coverage of Intelligence Data

It may be generally stated that the Department of State, through R, FC, and EUR/X has complete coverage on all intelligence material which is useful or informative. The CIA, the intelligence agencies of the military establishments and the informational sources among the civilian agencies of the U. S. Government have all been covered by liaison representatives and the material obtainable from these sources is flowing to the Department in a satisfactory manner. On the other hand, under the present system of operation, it is consistently true that reports prepared in either the R or FC areas are furnished to the end-users without checking or clearance with the other areas, with very few exceptions. In view of the fact that there are a number of items of an intelligence nature flowing exclusively to one or the other of these three areas, it is evident that the end-users must check with all three in order to be assured of having complete factual data, and it is a fact that many end-users do not know this and consequently make their action decisions on the basis of incomplete reports.

R has certain highly classified data secured from military intelligence agencies which is made available only to Assistant Secretaries and the political office directors, and is not available to FC or EUR/X.

FC has the exclusive liaison channel to FBI, and reports from that source, while used in FC, are not normally made available to R and EUR/X. Similarly, FC has a considerable amount of liaison contact with Secret Service, Customs, Bureau of Narcotics, and other civilian agencies, and has exclusive liaison with National Archives in the matter of review of the classified records of the Office of Censorship which are on file there. In addition, FC, now gets certain highly classified material from CIA which the latter agency specifically restricts as to dissemination to R.

EUR/X has in the past employed and trained certain persons who are now located in foreign posts. These persons had been sending in sealed reports which were forwarded unopened to EUR/X and were not made available to R or FC. In recent months arrangements have been made to provide this information to specified persons in the Office of the Special Assistant for Intelligence, but FC does not yet have access to these reports.

In addition, the head of this group receives a considerable amount of information from his large number of personal acquaintances here and abroad who are actively engaged in anti-communist study and activities. Examples are: Kestler, Kravchenko, Father Walsh, Mr. Mandel of the House Un-American Activities Committee, foreign and domestic labor union leaders, and many others.

Thus, one of the chief problems presented by the separate existence of two intelligence areas is that their products are incomplete to the degree that each has exclusive data either not available to or not sought by the other. For example: the group handling the more critical (in timing) field of security intelligence influences decisions and arranges for action on the basis of fragmentary information, although the full facts on the problem may exist in the other two areas but are unavailable or unused.

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V. Recommendations:

A. Objectives: Three objectives which should be sought in appraising proposals for change in the Department's intelligence organization structure are:

1. That the proposed intelligence organization must provide the Department both an alert and capable security action program and a thorough and competent research program, and
2. That all intelligence reports and predictions furnished to end-users shall be as accurate and complete as possible within the time limitations applicable and the resources available, and
3. That the intelligence organization should provide the least possible duplication in the fields of data collection, analysis, review, reporting and prediction which is compatible with the maintenance of a distinct and separate group of persons responsible for security action.

B. Proposals: To achieve these objectives, it is recommended that FC be separated from the Office of Controls, certain functions be consolidated with similar ones in the offices and divisions of R, and a new and strengthened security action group be established in the R area. More specifically this would involve:

1. Consolidation of the liaison staff of FC with the liaison staff of IAD

Discussion: This would eliminate duplication of review on reading panels and in liaison contact work. IAD would then be the sole liaison channel for the Department in the matter of securing intelligence material from the intelligence agencies of Army, Navy, Air Forces, and CIA, and from the law enforcement and security protection groups of Justice, Treasury and other civilian agencies. The only exception would be in the matter of those high level matters handled by S/S and the senior officers of the Department.

Such consolidation would also place in IAD the matters of general administrative problem liaison now handled by FC involving such items as civil claims and breaches of the peace on the part of military personnel abroad. It would also include the arrangements for establishment and maintenance of U. S. military missions abroad.

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2. Consolidation of the security name check work of FC into the BI work program.

Discussion: This would eliminate duplication of review and of card records and provide wider coverage of intelligence resources in the preparation of biographic reports.

It would be necessary to create a new area group in BI to cover the security name check work on U. S. citizens, and a central recording and expediting group would have to be established in the Office of the Division Chief to receive, expedite and release security name check reports.

It would be necessary to establish a group in BI to service security checks and other inquiries with respect to persons in international organizations.

3. The establishment in R, OIR, and the four DR divisions of the special Security Action Group.

Discussion: This would involve the establishment of a Special Deputy for Security Action in the Office of Mr. Armstrong, a similar Deputy with at least two professional assistants in the Office of the Director of OIR and the creation of a Special Assistant to the Chief for Security Action with one or two professional assistants in each of the DR divisions.

The Security Evaluation Group of FC is so small that one person has to review the flow of intelligence material for an entire continent, and the grades of most of the positions now established are at the apprentice professional levels, precluding the employment of enough highly trained and experienced persons for this work. On the other hand, the divisions of OIR in comparison are staffed so generously that assignments may be made on a country basis, and the grades of the positions established there afford an opportunity to employ the highest levels of professional personnel.

To strengthen the FC group in quantity and quality would accentuate the duplication and increase the competition and rivalry that now exists.

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The best solution would be the establishment of an intelligence structure which would permit a special affiliated but separate group in OIR and its divisions to work on security action matters. This would be similar to the organization plan of the Office of the Legal Adviser.

The Security Action persons located in the DR divisions would review all highly classified material, CIA reports and the information copies of telegrams and airgrams flowing into the Division, select items of apparent importance from a security standpoint, check the fragmentary items with the already existing group of research specialists for full background and context and then arrange for reporting the matter to the appropriate end-user. After proper clearance, they would arrange for the necessary security action to be taken by the Department or cooperating agencies. This plan would utilize the much larger flow of intelligence source material which now flows into OIR, as well as the specialized language training and expert knowledge available there.

4. EUR/X be required to establish a better clearance channel with R.

Discussion: Although EUR/X is a group primarily concerned with giving political advice to EUR and the other political offices and should remain in its present position in the Department's organization structure, it is true that it has many private intelligence contacts and some intelligence data which is not now available to the R or FC groups. Most of the contacts are personal ones developed by the head of the group over a long period of years, and most of the data is carried in his head.

Since he has stated that it is his intention to leave the Department in about two years, steps should be taken at once to provide him with an assistant of high professional grade, jointly suitable to him and to the R area, who will be introduced to the private contacts and instructed in the personal knowledge now not shared. The assistant should be assigned liaison duties between EUR/X and the R area, and provide the channel for clearance of information between the two.

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5. That an education program be developed which would inform the policy officers of the Department how they can get the best use and service from the consolidated intelligence area.

Discussion: There is considerable question in the minds of the policy officers of the Department to whom they should turn for specific types of intelligence reports. This question as it relates to the security, biographic information, and positive intelligence fields will be settled by the recommendation that these fields be merged. However, the problem still remains in relation to the R area. There is considerable lack of knowledge throughout the Department of the R area's capabilities and services. There is no Intelligence Handbook which would serve as a reference manual for policy officers. There are too few indoctrination and informational sessions between the policy officers of the Department and the officers of the R area with whom they should work.

There has been some justifiable criticism that reports prepared by certain parts of the R area have not been timely or accurate.

One method of overcoming these difficulties would be the issuance of an Intelligence Handbook. The Handbook should include the type of intelligence data available; distribution of the R personnel resources in terms of area, country, function, and service; description of the type of service rendered by the R area; priority assignments procedure; etc.

Another method would be the scheduling of a series of meetings between personnel of the R area and its users to develop closer working relations. This mechanism would tend to resolve the conflicts of opinion on the problems of timeliness or accuracy of reports.

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Exhibit A

Documents Relating to Attempts
to Resolve Intelligence Conflicts

- A-1 Memorandum from Assistant Secretary for Administration - Russell Plan
- A-2 Memorandum from SA-E to CON - Division of Responsibility between CON and OCD
- A-3 Memorandum prepared within CON - Survey of Intelligence Research Projects
- A-4 Memorandum of Conversation - Counter-Intelligence Research
- A-5 Memorandum from IAD to EC - Washington Document Center
- A-6 Memorandum from CON to SA-E - Division of Responsibility between CON and OCD
- A-7 Letter from SA-E to Navy Department - Defining State's Responsibility
- A-8 Letter from SA-E to War Department - Defining State's Responsibility
- A-9 Memorandum within OCD - Inauguration of Intelligence Reading Panel
- A-10 Memorandum from OIR to CON - Coordination of Activities
- A-11 Memorandum from CON to OIR - Coordination of Activities
- A-12 Memorandum from OIR and OCD to CON - Results of Conference
- A-13 Memorandum from CON to OIR and OCD - Working Arrangements
- A-14 Memorandum from OBP to A-P - Elimination of Secondary Screening of Telegrams
- A-15 Memorandum from CON to A-P - Elimination of Secondary Screening of Telegrams

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A-1

Department of State

Assistant Secretary

A-R/P

14 May 1946

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. LYON:

SUBJECT: Russell Plan of
Intelligence Research
Organization.

1. I have your comments on the above. Under the plan, the Special Assistant for Research and Intelligence and the Offices under his jurisdiction are limited to positive intelligence.
2. All aspects of security intelligence remain as previously under the exclusive jurisdiction of A-R. This includes, of course, the requisite security intelligence liaison with NIA and all other Federal agencies concerned. The liaison of the Special Assistant applies to positive intelligence matters only.
3. I realize, of course, that even with a clearly understood division of functions, possibilities of over-lapping between the two intelligence operations remain. These may be expected to occur most frequently in the field of collection and dissemination of information and in the several levels and spheres of interdepartmental liaison. On the basis of my past experience, I am entirely clear that this "peripheral overlap" can never be wholly eliminated but must be controlled through informal working agreements at all levels.
4. I made the foregoing very clear to Dr. Langer when Dr. Kent and Dr. Fahs first proposed that all intelligence materials should flow through OCD. I had a further talk on the matter with him yesterday. I am sure he fully understands what is expected of his organization in this sort of "team plan". So far as you are concerned, you should exercise great care that your liaison arrangements do not block the flow of positive intelligence material through OCD. I assume you have made mutually satisfactory arrangements with Colonel Fearing in this regard.

SIGNED: J. ANTHONY PANUCH

J. Anthony Panuch
Deputy Assistant Secretary
for Administration

cc: Dr. Langer

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CONF

A-2

December 11, 1946

TO: CON - Mr. Lyon
FROM: SA-E William A. Eddy
SUBJECT: Division of Responsibility between CON and CCD

Reference is made to our agreement upon division of responsibility between CON and CCD, in the meeting in my office yesterday morning which, in addition to yourself and myself, also was attended by the following:

Mr. Jack D. Neal - FC
Mr. D. A. Flinn - CON
Col. George A. Fearing - CCD
Mr. Paul Meyer - CCD
Mr. Forrest McCluney - SA-E

This memorandum is written in order that it may be a matter of record and form the basis of:

- a. Approval by ODA and the issuance of appropriate departmental announcements.
- b. Recommendations to A-R through MN requesting appropriate amendments in due course to the Departmental Regulations.
- c. Advice to appropriate Geographic Offices or other interested elements in the Department and other intelligence agencies.
- d. Internal administrative instructions within CCD and its component Divisions and FC for the purpose of implementing the general terms of our agreement, in which we all concurred.

It is our understanding, and it should be made clear to all concerned, that this agreement does not affect FC's existing responsibility as the Department's liaison channel with the War and Navy Departments for operational, administrative, counter-intelligence and other miscellaneous matters not involving secret intelligence.

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In general terms, it was agreed that OCD has the sole responsibility for:

- I. a. Procurement of positive foreign intelligence from all sources outside the Department, except FBI.
- b. Distribution of all such information and materials within the Department.
- c. Representing the Department in the field of positive intelligence procurement, with all other federal agencies, except FBI, censorship and captured enemy documents centers.
- d. Distribution to all other intelligence agencies, except FBI, of positive intelligence materials received from the Foreign Service.
- e. Maintaining the central reference collection of positive intelligence information and materials within the Department.
- f. Maintaining the central biographic files of the Department for positive intelligence purposes.
- II. a. Performing the liaison necessary to discharge the foregoing responsibilities.

It may be expected that, from time to time, questions of responsibility or other operating problems involving CON and OCD will develop, which may be resolved under the foregoing provisions; however, the following conclusions were reached on specific existing or potential problems involving FC and IAD functions:

- a. IAD, jointly with FC, shall represent the Department on MIS Reading Panel.
- b. IAD shall arrange for personnel to visit the intelligence Division (ID) of the War Department in connection with positive intelligence activities.
- c. IAD shall receive all positive foreign intelligence materials directly from ONI and maintain liaison for this purpose with appropriate officers of ONI.
- d. IAD shall arrange for personnel to visit ONI in connection with positive intelligence activities.
- e. IAD shall maintain liaison with all elements of CIG for the exchange of positive foreign intelligence materials.

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No final agreement was reached on the following problems, and further investigation and discussion should be carried on between our operating officials with a view to determining and establishing the best procedures for representing the Department and promoting its best interests:

- a. The acquisition and distribution of materials from the German Military Documents Center (GMDC).
- b. The acquisition and distribution of materials from the Washington Document Center (WDC).

You will recall that it was my belief that FC has the primary interest in captured enemy documents. Further consultation and investigation confirm my belief, and we agree that FC shall have primary contact and liaison with German Military Documents Center on matters concerning such material. It has been ascertained that the Washington Document Center has been transferred to CIG, and that its future functions have not yet been clearly defined. Accordingly, it is suggested that the question of representing the Department's interest with WDC be postponed until such definition is forthcoming.

I am very glad to have agreement on our previously overlapping functions, and I believe it should lead to much closer cooperation between our two organizations. It should eliminate the possibility of embarrassment to the Department which could occur if we followed the courses of dual and conflicting representation of the Department's interests with outside intelligence agencies.

I should like to assure you that it is my desire, and that of the Director of OCD and of all operating officials in OCD, to effect the closest, cordial cooperation between the two organizations.

If the foregoing represents your understanding of the agreement reached between us yesterday, I will instruct all personnel in my office to cooperate in every way with your office to implement the agreement.

SA-E:WAE:ejg

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A-3

FC - Mr. Neal:

December 17, 1946

CON - Mr. Flinn:

RE: Monthly Survey of Intelligence Research in Progress and Completed by OGL.

There is enclosed herewith the above-captioned survey, dated November 15, 1946 (copy No. 97). I have scanned the subjects of the various research projects being carried on in OGL and would like to commit for your consideration my observations with reference thereto.

Suggested Collaboration between FC and BI

Titles Nos. 10, 11, 12, 13, 50, 51, 88, 102, 137, 180 and 206 all deal with information being compiled by BI. In the main, it consists of biographic data on representatives to the General Assembly, Security Council and other international organizations as well as leading personalities in various countries. There are several projects dealing with personalities in Poland and other Russian satellite countries.

We have discussed this matter verbally before, and with the full knowledge that it is repetitious, it occurs to me that some of the effectiveness of the Security Intelligence Program within the Department is affected in permitting BI to prepare their material independently for the use of the Department and its officials. As I have previously indicated, I believe it would be a very worthwhile program to make the preparation of this type of biographic material a joint project between BI and FC. BI could prepare their usual material, which, I presume, does not bear a high classification. The accompanying document, prepared by FC, setting forth the subversive information on the individuals listed in the master document of BI could be an accompanying attachment with a higher classification as the needs might require. I do feel that FC has a definite service to render in this field and that an integration of the interests of BI and FC would be deeply appreciated by all of those officials of the Department that must deal with foreign diplomats, representatives and officials from day to day.

It would not be intended that FC reveal those sources or for that matter perhaps certain top secret information which it has, but would supply a summary of the facts for reference and use by Department officials.

Research Projects of OGL of possible interest to FC

Titles Nos. 29, 44, 47, 83, 86, 108, 112, 144, 180, 219, 221, 222, and 226, at first blush, appear to be research subjects which FC would be

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interested in having available for reference and use in connection with the background of subversive organizations in other countries of the world. Some of these research projects are situation surveys that should be of considerable current interest.

I am informed by Mr. McCluney, SA-E, that copies of these research surveys will be made available to FC upon request, and furthermore, if FC is desirous of having OCL engage in a research survey for background information in connection with its work, sympathetic consideration will be given the request. I can visualize that where FC might require background on a country which background is primarily positive intelligence that OCL might be able to render a real service.

I submit this suggestion for your consideration in carrying forth the work of your division.

Conflict of Interests between OCL and FC

Specific reference in this regard is made to Title 227, "Activities in other American republics of Agents of the Franco Government in Spain". I have been informed by Mr. McCluney, SA-E, that this request originated with ARA. You will recall that this is the project for which Harold Weisberg was gathering material. It is my opinion that this project, if it is done at all, should have been done by FC since it involves agents of a government outside the home country which is security intelligence or counter intelligence depending upon the term you wish to use. I cannot conceive in what manner a positive intelligence organization would consider itself interested in preparing material of this type, and I have so indicated my opinion to Mr. McCluney who could not put up any defense other than that it perhaps concerned the broader aspects of activities of Franco Spain in Latin America. From the information, however, which Weisberg has been attempting to collect that the survey embodies an examination of Falangist activities and activities of individual agents which can only be secured from the files of the FBI and other counter intelligence organizations with which FC has the primary responsibility for liaison and coordination of material available.

As soon as recent negotiations with SA-E have been finally resolved, I think this matter should come on the agenda for determination. I feel strongly that OCL has definitely gotten out of its field, perhaps through no fault of its own, but that factor should not alter in any way the stand that it is FC's job to do.

I would like for you to view the above observations in the light in which they are offered, namely, a protection and extension of the responsibilities of FC within its field. It is hoped that these observations may be of some assistance to you as a working paper.

Attachment: As stated.

CON:DAFlinn;ema

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Date: December 19, 1946

SUBJECT: COUNTER INTELLIGENCE RESEARCH

PARTICIPANTS: SA-E Mr. McCluney
OCL Mr. Allan Evans, Director
CON Mr. Flinn
FC Mr. Neal

COPIES TO: Mr. Cummings
Mr. Bradford
Miss Wellington
Mr. Barger
Mr. Morris

At a meeting with the aforementioned persons, the matter of FC participation in intelligence research was discussed.

The immediate problem was one which Mr. Flinn of CON considered an infringement upon FC's jurisdiction by ICD. That Division worked on a research project entitled: "Franco Agents in Latin America". During the meeting it was learned that through error the project had gotten underway without consultation or collaboration with FC.

After a general discussion on the subject, FC's jurisdiction in the field of research projects involving counter intelligence problems was recognized. Mr. Evans stated that from time to time FC will be called upon to collaborate on research projects which touch on counter intelligence and in other instances FC may be called upon to perform a counter intelligence research project alone.

Mr. Evans stated that in going over the "Monthly Survey of Intelligence Research in Progress and Completed", if it is noted that there are project in which FC could contribute, a telephone call should be made to ICD, Executive 6101, extension 711.

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I informed Mr. Evans and Mr. McCluney that as I viewed the entire problem it appeared to be one which could be solved by a closer working relationship between FC and the OGL groups. By such a relationship a mutual confidence will arise and the Department as a whole will be better served on research matters.

Mr. Evans agreed on this point and stated that after the holidays we should make plans to get the personnel together as much as possible.

NOTE TO FC OFFICERS:

FC's jurisdiction in all phases of the field of Counter Intelligence is being recognized more and more. We should, and must, iron out, on an amicable basis, any overlappings between the positive intelligence and counter intelligence fields. We recognize SA-E's jurisdiction in the former and they recognize ours in the latter.

Whenever possible each of us must establish closer working relationship with the SA-E group. It is to our mutual interest and is the only way to handle the work for the benefit of the entire Department.

For better handling of CE work, see that jobs which should be handled by FC are performed by the Division. At the same time, don't infringe upon the prerogatives of other Divisions.

FC:JDNeal;opv

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TO : FC - Mr. Bradford
FROM : IAD - T. M. Nordbeck
SUBJECT: Washington Document Center

January 9, 1947

1. This will serve to confirm our conversation of this date, at which the following points were covered:

a. The conversation was conducted on the basis of Mr. Eddy's memorandum to Mr. Lyon dated December 11, 1946.

b. It was determined that there was no duplication, overlapping or conflict between the services which FC and IAD are currently requesting from WDC, and that the interest of FC and IAD in the activities of WDC were separate and distinct.

c. IAD perceived no objection to FC having direct access to WDC, through the appropriate office of CIG.

d. IAD undertook to obtain permission from the appropriate official of CIG for this direct contact.

2. We have consulted Col. Boberg, Chief, Requirements Branch, C&D, through whom all requests for WDC action must be submitted. Col. Boberg is agreeable to FC contacting the Requirements Branch directly, without going through IAD.

3. IAD will be glad to introduce to Col. Boberg the member of your staff whom you designate, and to render any other assistance to FC which you may desire.

cc: Mr. Eddy
Mr. Fearing
Mr. Strong

IAD:TMNordbeck;fc

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SA-E Mr. William A. Eddy

January 15, 1947

CON Mr. F. B. Lyon

Division of responsibility between CON and OGD.

Reference is made to your memorandum dated December 11, 1946, bearing the above subject.

I have had an opportunity to review the results of our conference as set forth in reference memorandum and have had certain exploratory discussions within this Office and FC. I am in full agreement with the resolution of our problems as set forth by you but would like to make the following additional suggestions:

1. Although it is a matter of phrasing, it is suggested that the last sentence on the first page of your reference memorandum be changed to read "It is our understanding, and it should be made clear to all concerned, that this agreement does not affect FC's existing responsibility as the Department's liaison channel with the War and Navy Departments for operational, administrative, counter-intelligence and other miscellaneous matters not involving positive intelligence."
2. It is suggested since we are now in agreement, that a representative of MN be requested to be present at any future conference deemed appropriate where administrative detail is to be discussed. This will aid the representative from MN in helping to draft any Departmental announcements or regulations necessary.
3. With reference to Page 1, sub-paragraph c, it is requested that in distributing written advice to the appropriate geographic office, other interested elements in the Department, MI, ONI, and CIG, these communications be cleared with both of our offices prior to final distribution.

Specific reference is made to the first full paragraph on Page 3 of your reference communication dealing with the acquisition and distribution of materials from the German Military Documents Center (GMDC) and the Washington Document Center (WDC). I am informed by FC that Mr. Bradford (FC), Mr. T. M. Nordbeck (IAD) and Colonel Boberg of the Requirements Branch (C & D, War Department), have already had discussions on this subject and have resolved any difficulties that might have existed and reached a working agreement. This agreement should probably be formalized through MN at the same time other phases of the agreement are placed into effect by Departmental announcement or regulation.

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I too, am of the belief that our agreement is the most forward step made in our field in the Department in some time. It certainly should negate any charges of duplication or confusion which may arise in the future. I will be pleased to offer any further cooperation which may be necessary to assist in resolving our activities into a more efficient operating organization.

I have already instructed Mr. Neal (FC) to follow through on this program with Mr. McCluney (SA-E). The working personnel are to be pulled in and appropriate instructions issued after an initial conference for the purpose of a determination of the detailed mechanics of operation.

CON:DAFlinn;rh

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In reply refer to
SA-E

February 21, 1947

My dear Admiral Inglis:

In the past few weeks the Department of State has reviewed existing arrangements for exchanging intelligence information and materials with other federal agencies. Responsibility for performing this function has been clarified within the Department.

One of the responsibilities of the research and intelligence organization of the Department of State is to collect positive intelligence information and materials, both domestically and abroad, and to maintain a central collection of intelligence materials within the Department. Accordingly, it appears desirable for the Office of Intelligence Collection and Dissemination to be the point of contact for exchanging positive foreign intelligence between the Department of State and the Navy Department, and to perform the necessary liaison with the Navy Department for that purpose.

The Office of Controls will continue its responsibilities for security intelligence and counter-intelligence and will continue to perform the necessary liaison with the Navy Department in the discharge of that responsibility, as well as its present responsibility as liaison channel for operational, administrative and other matters not involving positive foreign intelligence.

If the foregoing arrangements do not appear to be inconsistent with Navy Department requirements, it would be appreciated if necessary action is taken to:

1. Accredit the officers designated by the Office of Intelligence Collection and Dissemination and the Office of Controls for performing liaison with the Office of Naval Intelligence, Navy Department, for purposes indicated above.

Rear Admiral Thomas B. Inglis,
Chief, Naval Intelligence,
Room 3076, Navy Department
Washington 25, D. C.

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2. Authorize the dissemination by the Office of Naval Intelligence of positive foreign intelligence information and materials to the Office of Intelligence Collection and Dissemination, Acquisition and Distribution Division, and of counter-intelligence and security intelligence to the Office of Controls, Division of Foreign Activity Correlation.

The foregoing arrangements would be very advantageous to the Department and, I believe, will result in better cooperation with the Navy Department.

Your favorable consideration of this proposal would be appreciated.

Sincerely yours,

William A. Eddy,
Special Assistant for
Research and Intelligence

IAD:THNordbeck:mjc
SA-E:FMCluney

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In reply refer to
SA-E

February 21, 1947

My dear General Chamberlin:

In the past few weeks the Department of State has reviewed existing arrangements for exchanging intelligence information and materials with other federal agencies. Responsibility for performing this function has been clarified within the Department.

One of the responsibilities of the research and intelligence organization of the Department of State is to collect positive intelligence information and materials, both domestically and abroad, and to maintain a central collection of intelligence materials within the Department. Accordingly, it appears desirable for the Office of Intelligence Collection and Dissemination to be the point of contact for exchanging positive foreign intelligence between the Department of State and the War Department, and to perform the necessary liaison with the War Department for that purpose.

The Office of Controls will continue its responsibilities for security intelligence and counter-intelligence and will continue to perform the necessary liaison with the War Department in the discharge of those responsibilities, as well as its present responsibility as liaison channel for operational administrative and other matters not involving positive foreign intelligence.

If the foregoing arrangements do not appear to be inconsistent with War Department requirements, it would be appreciated if necessary action is taken to:

1. Authorize representatives of both the Office of Intelligence Collection and Dissemination and the Office of Controls to sit as State Department representatives on the Intelligence Division Reading Panel.

2. Authorize

Major General S. J. Chamberlin,
Director of Intelligence,
War Department
Room 2E800, Pentagon
Washington 25, D. C.

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2. Authorize separate distribution, to their respective offices, of items selected by both Department of State members of the Reading Panel. This should not involve any appreciable duplication, since each member will select only items which pertain to the interests of his organization, as indicated above.

3. Address all material sent to the Department of State on "standard distribution" to the Office of Intelligence Collection and Dissemination, Acquisition and Distribution Division.

4. Accredited the officers designated by the Office of Intelligence Collection and Dissemination and the Office of Controls for performing liaison with the Intelligence Division, War Department, for purposes indicated above.

The foregoing arrangements would be very advantageous to the Department, and I believe will result in better cooperation with the War Department.

Your favorable consideration of this proposal would be appreciated.

Sincerely yours,

William A. Eddy
Special Assistant for
Research and Intelligence

IAD:TMNordbeck;njc
SA-E:FMCluney

2/5/47
2/18/47

CCD

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March 5, 1947

CCD Col. George Fearing

CCD Mr. Paul T. Meyer

Inauguration of Intelligence Reading Panel

As directed on February 24th by Mr. William A. Eddy, Special Assistant for Research and Intelligence the operation of a Reading Panel on behalf of intelligence agencies of the Government was inaugurated this morning, March 5th in room 1166, New War Building, adjoining the Division of Communications and Records.

Objectives

The Panel was established on recognition by Mr. Eddy of the need for a system of selecting and expeditious disseminations of positive intelligence despatches and reports from our Foreign Service on behalf of the Intelligence Agencies. It was recognized under NIA Directive #7 that jurisdictional claim should not impede the full flow of intelligence and Major General Stephen J. Chamberlin, Director of Intelligence, WDGS has indicated that duplicate reporting by Military Attaches would be discontinued as soon as the War Department was assured that pertinent Foreign Service positive intelligence materials would be made available to that Department as it is received. It was also ascertained that the time lag for the duplication and transmittal of documents between the Department and the War Department averaged 12 working days and that this time lag will be reduced. It was, in addition, shown that under the practice of standardized distributions a great deal of unneeded intelligence was duplicated and distributed and that the Panel will reduce this unnecessary paper work; certain important intelligence was not distributed in the past and the Panel will eliminate these lapses.

Operation of Panel

The Panel Room is located in a position where all pertinent pouch materials may be scrutinized by members of the Panel within a few hours after it is received. The Analysts in IC/R automatically eliminate all passport, visa and administrative correspondence. A screening and allocation desk then eliminates intelligence information materials of a delicate nature which concerns only the Department such as policy and operational matters. While we have started slowly with approximately 175 papers passing through the Panel the first day the average time lag was somewhat less than 8 minutes. It is believed that when all reports and a few other items are routed over the panel in the course of the coming week that the time lag for a full flow of up to 400 documents per day will not be over 1/2 hour.

Members of the Panel

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Members of the Panel

The members of the Panel at the opening were as follows:

Allocation desk - Messrs. Ball and Feeney, DG/R; Mr. Chandler, IAD.

Mr. Bright, REF, to pick out intelligence needed by OIR.

Mr. Donovan, FC, to pick out intelligence needed by FC.

Colonel Newton and Major Flora, War Department Intelligence Group.

It is understood the Navy Department will nominate a member to begin next Monday, that OIG will follow with a member on Wednesday and that the Army Air Force will delegate a member shortly thereafter. All members will have alternates and there will be ample time allowed for members to acclimate in their home areas for orientation and information as to the up to the minute needs of research staffs.

Staff

SA-E, Mr. McClurey, has authorized the use of 4 vacant budget slots for IAD administrative staffing of the Panel. Since IAD has nominated Mr. Chandler, one of our better Procurement Officers to the Panel, one of these positions has been filled as of today by Mr. Vincelet, who has transferred from the Special Projects Division and will function as a Procurement Officer to replace Mr. Chandler. We obtained the services of Miss Jean Kennedy, CAF-7, Procurement Specialist and Expediter from the Division of Management Planning. A Stenographer is being obtained from surplus to assist in general copy and photographic work. A CAF-2 duplicating machine operator has been obtained for duty next week. It is believed this staff, plus the 4 persons supplied by the War Department will fully suffice the program even should it grow in scope.

General Comment

My observations today indicate that this is one of the most advanced steps in a long time by the Department towards cementing relationships with other agencies concerned. It was also indicated that OCD was able to select many documents essential to the OIR research programs which would not have found their way to the intelligence area through the ordinary Departmental channels. Similarly the War Department selected intelligence and all 3 areas rejected many documents as being of no interest although they would have received multiple copies through the old system. It is anticipated that through this operation and the new selection system that the amount of duplicating work necessary in the Department may be reduced 1/3 with a saving in man years in other areas of the Department and a reduction in time lags. The question of distribution of materials attached to enclosures to despatches and reports in limited numbers will be resolved at this point rather than as under the former confused system. It is further believed

that documents which

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that documents which are received from the Foreign Service posts in reproducible form will be delivered to the end users within two working days of the time they leave the Panel. It was found that the War Department has been sending the Department long lists of missing Foreign Service despatch numbers. This caused personnel in FC, FR, DC/R and REF as well as desk officers throughout the Department to begin wide searches for these items which in practically every case turned out to be of an administrative nature or a communication otherwise of no interest to the War Department. It can be roughly estimated that the Department will save some 20 man years since the War Department, now having access to all pertinent material through their Panel member, will discontinue sending these lists. The same will, of course, be true of the other intelligence agencies and we will have the record of such items which have been rejected by their members. Naturally the saving in paper work by the end-users throughout all intelligence organizations will be considerable.

We have heard general comment from high ranking officials of the War Department of their great pleasure that the Department has taken this forward step. It is apparent that officials within the Department will benefit. It is probable that if there is a free and expeditious exchange of intelligence source materials between the State, War and Navy Departments that the setting up of a Reading Panel by the CIG to cover these 3 areas may be unnecessary. Future plans contemplate a similar system for the dissemination of telegrams and airgrams.

I would like to stress that the establishment of the Reading Panel has been a joint project between OCD-IAD and ODA-DC/R. FC and FR have been of considerable assistance and MN has been apprised in general of the undertaking. Mr. Scott, Chief of the Division of Communications and Records, and his assistant, Mr. Kirby, have cooperated and assisted Mr. Strong, Chief of the Acquisition and Distribution Division, and Mr. Nordbeck, Assistant Chief, and myself in every possible way. It is contemplated that the Panel will continue to function as a Joint Departmental project, IAD in line with Departmental Regulations assuming the policy responsibility for the dissemination of positive intelligence and the direction of the members of the Panel and DC assuming responsibility for the procedural administration and custody of the Department's correspondence.

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A-10

TO: CON Mr. Robinson

August 21, 1947

FROM: OIR Allan Evans

SUBJECT: Coordination of Activities of OIR and FC

It seemed to me that our recent discussions involved three principal points:

(a) a misconception on the part of FC as to the SA-E function of providing the foreign intelligence required by the Department in the conduct of foreign affairs and in the safeguarding of the national security, and the corresponding OIR function of preparing intelligence studies and spot intelligence for authorized recipients in the Department, CIG, and other Federal agencies;

(b) a general confusion as to the precise line between foreign positive intelligence and foreign security information;

(c) an apparent belief by FC that, for security reasons, OIR is not eligible to receive certain intelligence information in the Secret and Top Secret categories.

I believe that most of these points were reasonably well clarified during the course of our discussion but I will, with your permission, restate briefly OIR's position. For some time we have considered that "intelligence information" (or raw intelligence) is information, pertaining to foreign areas, which may affect U. S. foreign policy or national security; that "intelligence research" is the continuous process of assembling, evaluating, analyzing, and interpreting available intelligence information; and that "intelligence" is the product of the interpretive process, issued in the form of finished estimates of actual or potential situations in foreign areas which may affect U. S. policy. The term "positive" is, in our view, simply a means of distinguishing between the subject matter of the intelligence which we produce and the subject matter of what is generally known as counter or security intelligence. The term in no wise describes a source of information, for the intelligence which OIR produces is built on material derived from overt and covert sources. By the same token, the term "intelligence Research" in no way connotes any distinctive time-lag in production, for on the basis of the research continuously in process, the OIR as an intelligence organization is prepared at any moment to assess one or more items of current "information" and transform them into properly focussed "intelligence" within the positive field.

I urge this latter point because upon it seemed to depend a large part of FC's misunderstanding of our functions. Not only do we produce long-range and sometimes lengthy intelligence reports utilized for such purposes

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as SWNCC consideration, Kennan Committee consideration, and United Nations deliberations, but in addition we have a heavy responsibility for current, spot intelligence reporting, and to that end we maintain a close working relationship with the political, cultural, and economic areas of the Department, as well as with the positive intelligence agencies represented in CIG, G-2, ONI and A-2;

The distinction between positive and counter or security intelligence is, therefore, one of subject matter, not one of timing in production, and most particularly not one of raw information. We agreed, I remember, that just as FC requires our positive intelligence to assist in its work, OIR is interested in much of the raw information upon which FC works directly but, which, in addition to its value for security intelligence, has simultaneous value in positive intelligence. Foreign movements, covert or overt, involve us if they have potential influence on the political, social, or economic life of foreign nations. Subversion or penetration as such concern us whenever they affect foreign developments. A subversive movement may operate, by direct action, to injure U. S. property or personnel abroad, or to penetrate the U. S. itself; such activities we understand to be the concern of FC. The same subversive movement may aim at the over-throw of a foreign government, and under that aspect it is our concern because inevitably it involves the conduct of our foreign relations with that country. Plainly, therefore, FC and OIR will sometimes have complementary interests in the same intelligence targets, and will need to develop their complementary interpretations out of the same raw information.

As we pointed out at our meeting, the SA-E organization through special security measures is qualified to, and does, handle materials of all classifications. By regulation, the Special Assistant for Research and Intelligence is authorized, in consultation with A-P, to adopt such special security measures within the intelligence organization, additional to normal Departmental security regulations, as are required by the nature of our work. In fact, the SA-E organization does operate under security regulations beyond those of other areas of the Department and within itself has facilities for special handling of different classifications of material.

Your suggestion for a working arrangement based on general principles rather than on inflexible and unrealistic jurisdictional definitions, is, I believe, extremely sound. As I understood our tentative agreement, each of us would appoint a liaison officer to handle all matters of possible interest to OIR or FC. Each such officer would be in constant communication with his opposite number and would be kept constantly informed of projects under way in OIR and FC. Each would arrange for the exchange of pertinent intelligence information and intelligence reports, without regard to classification. Earlier agreements between BI and FC would continue in force and be unaffected by the new liaison arrangements. FC would, of course, continue its liaison functions with outside security organizations but would make available, through these liaison channels, information acquired thereby which might be of use to OIR.

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As a starting point, FC's functions in the field of intelligence production would be concerned with actual and potential subversive individuals, with espionage, and with penetration activities abroad aimed directly at U. S. interests. We recognize that in this last category there may be occasional areas of overlap but we hope that by close coordination and a gradual process of refinement of jurisdiction regarding potential political movements, we will arrive at a highly satisfactory working agreement.

If it is agreeable to you, I would like to nominate Mr. Louis Nemzer as my liaison officer under the terms of reference outlined above. I would appreciate your letting me know your reactions to this draft memorandum and I hope it may constitute the beginning of a really successful joining of forces.

OIR:AEvans;nhl

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TO: OIR Allan Evans

August 28, 1947

FROM: CON H. Robinson

SUBJECT: COORDINATION OF THE ACTIVITIES OF OIR AND FC.

Your memorandum of August 21 on the above subject has been read with considerable interest. In general, I should like to comment that your memorandum seems to outline the relationship between FC and OIR quite clearly. I agree with you in your feeling that the area of interest of OIR is the field of the larger political movements and longer range political implications of the intelligence which reaches the Department of State, whereas the interest of FC lies in the evidence which this intelligence may contain of subversive or hostile activity directed against the interests of the United States by individuals or organizations abroad. For instance, the development of the Communist Party in France, according to my conception, would fall within the sphere of interest of OIR, insofar as the political activities of that party would influence the French government in such a way as to affect the policy of the United States government toward the government of France. However, if members of the Communist Party in France, or Communist organizations in France should direct their efforts toward penetration of any agency of the United States government or toward damaging in any way the interests of the United States in France, such activity would fall within the purview of FC. Furthermore, if the activities of Communist or other hostile political organizations should affect the operations of the security control agencies of the United States, such as the Visa Division or the Passport Division, or others, that activity also would lie in the field which FC covers.

In my thinking about the subject matter with which OIR and FC deal, I distinguish between positive intelligence and counter intelligence or security intelligence. It seems to me that positive intelligence includes information concerning political developments abroad which are not aimed particularly against the United States, though they may indirectly influence the foreign policy of the United States, whereas counter intelligence or security intelligence, as I see it, deals primarily with the efforts of foreign intelligence or propaganda agencies to attack the agencies or interests of the United States. It seems clear to me that the source of the information which reaches the State Department is no criterion whatever whether such information lies in the field of interest of OIR or FC; just as you have pointed out in your memorandum, but that it is the nature of the information itself which should determine that question.

I wish to point out further that much of the intelligence in which FC is interested is of an operational or tactical nature so that it often becomes of immediate interest to the agencies of the Department in carrying on the

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routine detailed functions for which they are responsible. For this reason it is frequently not possible for FC to make as full an evaluation of the raw intelligence which it receives as is possible for OIR, with its longer range research function. In fact, it is quite possible that an officer of FC may consider it necessary to relay a report to the field which is based solely on a suspicion because it may be important for departmental officers working in the field to know that that suspicion exists, even though it has not been fully substantiated. Of course, it is the policy to keep the dissemination of such unsubstantiated information to a minimum, but occasions do exist when speed of transmittal is more important than thoroughness of evaluation. As implied above, this grows out of the "operational" character of FC's intelligence activities.

Again referring to your memorandum, it becomes quite obvious that OIR and FC will often have mutual interests in intelligence received on the same subject and from the same sources. For this reason I agree with you that it is quite important for FC and OIR to arrange for a free exchange of information. However, I do feel obliged to point out that FC has been making a real effort to limit its intake of intelligence material as far as possible to such as lies within its field of interest, which is primarily foreign individuals and organizations hostile to the interests of the United States. This is being done because it is basically the threat to the security of the United States as revealed in such information which interests FC. However, when items appear which we believe will be of interest to OIR we will be glad to route them to you. I mention this limitation on FC's intake merely to forestall any suspicion of a lack of good faith which might be occasioned by a limited flow of information from FC to OIR. On behalf of FC I wish to state your reciprocal policy of forwarding information of counter intelligence or security interest to this division will be much appreciated. There is no question whatever of OIR's being entitled to any information passing through FC because of a high security classification. I realize that your personnel are cleared for the handling of highly classified information just as those in FC are.

If the type of relationship between OIR and FC which is indicated above is to be developed there will be much occasion for consultation back and forth on problems of mutual interest and there may even be occasion for the issuance of joint reports or separate reports on different aspects of the same problem. In order to facilitate such consultation, I am happy to acquiesce in your suggestion that liaison officers be appointed to work out a relationship between FC and OIR. Mr. Broecker of FC has already had occasion to contact Mr. Nemzer and as a result of a conference between them I feel that a cooperative relationship can speedily be developed. In order to work out such a plan I have appointed Mr. T. W. Broecker as a liaison representative of FC to cooperate with your Mr. Nemzer in developing liaison between our two organizations. Mr. Broecker's office is located in 820A - 515 22nd Street and he may be reached on Extension 2594. If you feel that a further discussion of this problem is necessary I shall be glad to consult with you at any convenient time.

FC:TWBroecker:bk

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October 6, 1947

MEMORANDUM

TO: CCW - Mr. Robinson
Mr. Neal

FROM: GCD - George R. Fearing, Jr.
OIR - Allan Evans

SUBJECT: Conclusions of our Conference on 6 October 1947

1. We agreed upon the modification of the first sentence in the draft regulation to establish a focal point for information on cases involving "security control measures relating to" the activities of individuals and organizations. With this modification, we were glad to concur in the draft text.

2. In respect of foreign and international organizations we reached further clarification of the principle that whereas the activities of agents or subversive personnel in such organizations are the concern of FC, the nations are the responsibility of OIR. It was further agreed that FC in supplying information to the rest of the Department relating to its interests in such organizations would (a) preferably contact us so that a final and complete evaluation could be delivered jointly concerning these organizations, or (b) indicate explicitly in any reply made without OIR participation that its information related to security intelligence alone and that further information and over-all evaluation should be obtained from OIR.

3. In further discussion of international organizations it was clearly indicated by FC that in certain recent cases where it had sent inquiries to the field concerning organizations, the failure to clear with OIR or BI had been an oversight. We draw from this conversation the conclusion, though it was not explicitly stated at the time, that all such inquiries concerning foreign and international organizations will be coordinated with us before they are sent out to the field.

4. FC reassured OIR and GCD that it knew of no criticism of their security outside the Department and had none itself. FC therefore undertook to impress upon its liaison officer with OIR that no security consideration stood in the way of free interchange of information.

We feel that with these understandings we have gone far to clear up the residual problems that remained after our previous discussion of some weeks ago. Complicated though these discussions may be, they are serving a most useful purpose. We are, on both sides, coming to realize the vital interdependence of our operations, and at the same time the urgent necessity of

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making clear to our customers the distinction between our responsibilities. Gradually we come to appreciate the difference in the meanings of words we use so that we now know that the word "intelligence" to you means raw information and to us means finally evaluated and integrated information. We hope you are now aware that there exists no necessary distinction between our offices in the timing of the response to a request, in that we keep up to date on subjects of interest and are prepared to deliver an evaluation as of any moment. We, are, in the end, coming to identify a basic difference in our philosophies of operation: FC is prepared at any time to deliver such information within its field of competence as is at any moment available, whereas our object is to deliver a comprehensive evaluation which may both indicate gaps and uncertainties in the coverage and draw in any unexpected connotations pertinent to the subject requested. This last point probably explains much of whatever uncertainty remains between us; it will be met if, as we agreed this morning, we regard ourselves as partners in the service of the Department and carefully and explicitly indicate to our customers our respective fields of competence.

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OIR - Mr. Allan Evans
OCD - Mr. George R. Fearing, Jr.
CON - Mr. Robinson

October 30, 1947

Working Arrangements.

I am in general agreement with your memorandum of October 6, 1947, concerning our conference on that date. However, I think it may be worthwhile to give you a few of my observations on the same subject.

From the nature of the Department's operations, I fully agree that it will usually not be possible for FC to institute extensive independent research in order to obtain information needed for a fully evaluated and comprehensive answer to an inquiry. The work of FC is operational in character for the most part. Its function is to furnish immediate information to action officers and to assemble as expeditiously as possible information already available in the Department or which may be obtained through liaison channels. Sometimes it is necessary to pass along even unevaluated information if it is pertinent to a pending decision, and in some situations it is necessary to advise action officers of the existence of a suspicion which cannot be substantiated, if the existence of that suspicion has a bearing on the decision to be made. Most situations of that type involve decisions of a security nature, and every effort is made to obtain an evaluation of information collected. However, the making of a security decision on a proposed course of action concerns the control activities of the Department and, I believe, a matter within FC's field of competence.

Obviously, the fields of interest of FC, OIR and OCD may overlap in some areas. In carrying out our respective programs, it will of course be necessary to arrange for a free exchange of information. This is especially true in the area of international organizations where our interests are likely to overlap, since it is obviously impossible to draw a strict line of separation between different types of organizations and between the activities of subversive personnel within an organization and the activities of the organization itself.

In the interest of avoiding duplication and unnecessary overlapping effort, FC will arrange with OIR to clear with each other inquiries to the missions abroad. Further, FC will avail itself of the opportunity to consult with OIR concerning the evaluation of information on international organizations or on any other subject for the purpose of preparing a well-evaluated report. Similar inquiries from OIR are equally desirable. FC will also advise officers requesting information that additional data on the same subject may be available in OCD or OIR. We would hope that your people would do the same.

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The type of relationship between FC and OIR which is indicated above will require the closest cooperation and consultation on problems of mutual interest. There may be occasion for the issuance of joint reports or separate reports on different aspects of the same problem. Thus, an active and consistent liaison arrangement is vital to its success. I am, therefore, very glad to act upon the suggestion made in your memorandum of August 21, to me regarding the appointment of liaison officers to handle all matters of possible interest to OIR and FC. Mr. Broecker of FC has already had occasion to contact Mr. Nemser, and as a result of a conference between them, arrangements for working out a cooperative relationship have been developed. It is planned to continue these discussions so that complete arrangements may be established at the working level. I am confident that along the lines set out above a satisfactory mutual working arrangement can be developed between FC, OGD and OIR to the considerable advantage of the Department.

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THROUGH: A Mr. Pourifoy
OBP Mr. William O. Hall
OB Stanley T. Orear

April 7, 1948

**Elimination of Secondary Screening of Telegram Copies Provided by
State Department to Army and Navy**

Problem:

To provide more economical, direct and faster transmission of information copies of incoming and outgoing State Department telegrams to the Departments of the Army and Navy by the elimination of secondary screening.

Background:

In the course of the survey of the intelligence functions performed by R, FC, and EUR/X conducted by Mr. Fred Darnell and Mr. John Moore of this Division, the problem identified above was encountered. Although the survey has not been completed, it is felt that the solution of this problem can be reached immediately.

Under the present functional assignments in the Department, DC/T prepares the master copy and produces all necessary information copies of every incoming and outgoing telegram, indicating on each the distribution made within the Department. An exception is that DC/T provides 12 copies of each telegram of an intelligence nature to FC, where they are recorded, screened, and if approved, 9 copies are released to Army and Navy. The remaining 3 copies are routed within FC and ultimately filed there. At present, of the 300 telegrams a day which FC receives for further distribution to these agencies, it withholds an average of only 10 a day. This process involved the use of six positions in a Special Telecommunications Unit in FC at the time the survey was made in November, although some economies in personnel have been effected since then.

It will be noted that this procedure makes it impossible for DC/T to indicate on information copies of telegrams whether or not distribution has been made to Army and Navy, and any inquiries must be referred to FC. The FC channel for distribution of telegrams to Army and Navy was created in consequence of the assignment to FC of the function of performing liaison activities with respect to security intelligence with the intelligence areas of the respective departments. It should be noted, however, that IAD has the responsibility for the function of performing liaison activities with respect to positive intelligence with the same intelligence areas. FC points out that its present exclusive control over the distribution of intelligence telegrams to Army and Navy gives FC's liaison officers an intangible but definitely worthwhile psychological advantage in dealing with those agencies. Within the past month letters have been received from the Secretaries of Army and Navy formally requesting that FC screening be eliminated.

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Conclusions:

1. The distributors in DC/T now review and route all telegrams and airgrams in the first instance, and they could screen for release to Army and Navy during the same operation with some additional assistance, eliminating the second duplicating screening review performed now in FC, and saving most of the manpower used therefor.

2. The system of recording used by FC is too complicated and constitutes an excessive use of manpower.

3. If DC/T determines distribution to Army and Navy, it would then be able to indicate such distribution on the master copy and on all copies distributed within the department of State, thus informing all interested persons at the time of original distribution, affording a single central point in the Department for all reference calls and eliminating many of the inquiries now directed to FC.

4. The present advantage of telegram control to FC's liaison function works to the disadvantage of IAD's liaison function.

5. The present system of secondary screening in FC is disliked by Army and Navy, and its elimination on our part would place the State Department in a position to denounce the similar practices which Army and Navy now use. OB's opinion on this point has the concurrence of S/S-R, CDA, DC, and IAD.

Recommendations:

1. That the Telecommunications Unit of FC be abolished.

2. That the function of screening information copies of telegrams and airgrams for release to Army and Navy be transferred from FC to DC/T.

3. That the remaining functions of the Telecommunications Unit be assigned to the Mail and File Unit of FC together with one of the positions and its incumbent.

4. That one CAF-5 position and incumbent be transferred from FC to DC/T.

5. That the remaining four positions be abolished, thus reducing FC by the four positions necessary to conform to the 1949 budget proposals and assisting the Office of Controls to take care of part of the proposed reductions in the total office budget for 1949.

OB:FDarnell & JMoore/rfw
4/7/48

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April 16, 1948

THRU : A -Mr. Peurifoy
: OBP - Mr. Hall
CON -Mr. Nicholson

CON has reviewed the recommendations being submitted by OB proposing the transfer to DC of the Telecommunications liaison function with the Army and Navy of FC.

During the course of the recent survey of FC, Messers. Moore and Darnell called attention to a detailed method of handling, recording and routing messages to the Army and Navy. The system was initiated some time ago to meet more stringent security standards existing at a time when the Division was the sole liaison agency for the Department with the Army and the Navy. The recommendations for simplifying the procedure were adopted immediately while the survey was in progress with the result that there are now only two people performing this function in the Division, the remaining employees having been transferred to other work.

The proposed transfer will not eliminate all the functions formerly performed by the Telecommunications Unit since the FBI telecommunications traffic will continue to flow through the Division, as well as the normal Division traffic. However, the Unit as such has been abolished and the necessary functions are now being performed as a part of the regular mail and files operations of the Division.

Past experience in the Division proves that the loss of the routing of Army and Navy material through FC may have a detrimental effect on the effectiveness of the Division in terms of its other liaison duties with these agencies.

The function of distributing telegrams to the Department of the Army and the Department of the Navy has given FC a quid pro quo to offer in exchange for the security information received from those agencies. This facilitates the collection of security information by FC.

Apart from other considerations of the problem the Department received simultaneous proposals from the Army and Navy for the elimination of secondary screening of telegrams as a step in the routing of telecommunications traffic, in response to which the Department offered to eliminate such secondary screening and route the material direct from the communications center provided we were accorded similar direct service by those agencies. The Army, which

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accounts for approximately 80% of the traffic, is unwilling to agree. As the Department proposed the internal transfer of this function as a means of obtaining similar consideration, it does not appear consistent to make the change in view of the Army's unwillingness to accord the Department similar direct service in complying with their request.

For purposes of clarity the specific OB recommendations and our position on each is as follows:

1. "That the Telecommunications Unit of FC be abolished."

This has been done.

2. "That the function of screening information copies of telegrams and aigrams for release to Army and Navy be transferred from FC to DC/T."

The loss of this function will deprive the Division of one of its means whereby information not freely volunteered by Army and Navy is sometimes obtained. In view of the benefits which the Department may derive from direct routing however, CON will agree to the transfer of the function to DC if the Army and the Navy agree to a similar direct routing.

3. "That the remaining functions of the Telecommunications Unit be assigned to the Mail and File Unit of FC together with one of the positions and its incumbent."

This has been done

4. "That one CAF-5 position and incumbent be transferred from FC to DC/T."

This is to be reconsidered when agreement is reached under No. 2 above.

5. "That the remaining four positions be abolished, thus reducing FC by the four positions necessary to conform to the 1949 budget proposals and assisting the Office of Controls to take care of part of the proposed reductions in the total office budget for 1949."

The four positions will not be filled, the personnel having been assigned to other duties in the Division, except for one person who has resigned.

CON:GHStewart,Jr:rh

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INT 758/5

January 20, 1948

MEMORANDUM

TO: CB - Mr. Stanley T. Grear

FROM: CB - Fred Darnell and John Moore

SUBJECT: Survey of Division of Foreign Activity Correlation

You will recall that following the hearings at the Bureau of the Budget in October, 1947, Mr. Hulten - A-P and Mr. Hall - CBP requested that a survey be made of FC, EURX and SA-E to determine (1) whether any duplication existed in the work of these three groups and (2) whether the absence of knowledge in each group of the work of the other two resulted in the non-coverage of some intelligence matters.

We have concluded our survey of FC, and before proceeding to the next group have prepared the attached narrative report to provide an answer to the question so frequently raised, "Just what do all those people do in FC?" The report describes the actual activities which occupy the time of all but four employees, whose work is not described completely in order to avoid reference to certain highly classified intelligence matters.

Stripped of detail, the essential job which FC performs for the Department is to discover, through a discerning review of the security intelligence data it secures, activities of persons or organizations or trends of incidents which can reasonably be stated to menace now or be predicted to menace in the future the security of the United States or its interests. It is the further job of FC to develop all possible additional information with respect to such items and to bring the data to the attention of the appropriate action officers, following up to make certain that consideration is given and decisions are made.

We have also prepared a tentative list of conclusions which are critical of the internal organization and operations of FC. These cannot be accepted as having complete validity until other areas involved in the intelligence field have been examined.

The draft of the report and the conclusions have been reviewed and discussed with Mr. Neal, Chief of FC, and his Assistant Chief, Mr. Amshey, and they agree that the factual presentation in the report is correct, and that the conclusions are reasonable. In fact, they were already aware of some of the criticisms, particularly with respect to the handling of mail and files, and have undertaken steps to improve the situation.

Mr. Hamilton Robinson, Director of CON, has expressed an original desire for and a continuing interest in this survey and has assigned his Deputy, Mr. Nicholson, and his Executive Officer, Mr. Stewart, to serve alternately with the CB representatives as part of the interviewing team. After this report has had your review, it is requested that copies be made available to Mr. Robinson - CON and Mr. Neal - FC.

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Survey of Division of Foreign Activity Correlation

January 19, 1948

Fred Darnell

John Moore

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INT 758/59

Preliminary Narrative Report

Survey of Division of Foreign Activity Correlation

I. FUNCTIONS

The Division of Foreign Activity Correlation, Office of Controls, initiates policy and conducts operational and liaison activities with respect to the foreign security intelligence programs of the Department. Sixty-eight people are now employed, presently organized into three branches and engaged in the following activities:

1. Initiate and develop policy with respect to the collection, evaluation, use and distribution of foreign security information.
2. Develop, maintain and improve liaison channels between the Department and all other security, investigative and intelligence agencies to provide a two way flow of foreign security data. Review incoming and outgoing telegrams to determine which should go to War, Navy and FBI (not CIA) and which should be withheld.
3. Review security information from all sources, discovering significant items and preparing written summaries concerning persons, organizations or incidents which are now or are likely to be inimical to United States security interests, bring such matters to the attention of the appropriate action units of the Department and making specific recommendations as to whether a security risk exists.
4. Maintain a master index and provide a single central point for the Department and other investigative agencies to secure evaluated security name checks on persons suspected of subversive activities toward United States interests abroad.
5. Provide advisory opinions to Passport Division, Visa Division and all other interested work units of the Department with respect to the security risks to the United States involved in the movement of persons, American or alien, into or out of the United States and between foreign countries. Maintain special record files and provide advisory opinions on security questions to occupation authorities with respect to the international movement of Germans, Austrians and Japanese.
6. Arrange for the establishment of United States military training missions abroad.
7. Review copies of applications filed by agents of foreign government with the Department of Justice. Develop security information with respect to such persons and notifies the political divisions and the foreign missions.

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II. GENERAL ORGANIZATION

Although the Department of State Organizational Manual sheet 1.814 dated August 1, 1947, indicates the existence of four branches and the functional chart prepared for the 1949 budget presentation dated September 1, 1947, indicates two branches, the latter most nearly represents the existing situation.

Mr. Jack Neal, as Chief, directs the activities of the Division; Mr. Anshey serves in the capacity of an all-around Assistant Chief and gives personal direction to the Armed Services Section and the Civilian Agencies Section; Mr. Jessop directs the Administrative Section and Mr. Broecker directs the Travel Security Section and the Security Evaluation Section.

In view of the organizational changes, reassignments of personnel and appointments of new personnel, many employees interviewed were unable to discuss their work assignments in terms of percentages of time spent on particular operations, and precise divisions of functions and operations have not yet been developed between the Sections. These points will be supported in the following discussions of the Sections.

III. LIAISON BRANCH

The Armed Services Section (five positions: two at P-4, and three clerical) and the Civilian Agencies Section (five positions: two at P-5, and 3 clerical), directed by Mr. Anshey, are the two Sections engaged primarily in liaison activities with other agencies, to the end that there will be assured a secure flow of security intelligence data into the Division from all sources within or without the Department as well as to assure a secure flow of security intelligence data out of the Department to those agencies which merit receiving it. In addition, these liaison channels afford the means of making official representations to the agencies concerned relative to official business of the Department.

In the case of Army, Navy, and Air, the work involves daily visits to those agencies, attendance at reading panels in the agencies, selection of materials from lists, arranging for the release to those agencies of State Department telegrams and airgrams after prior screening, establishment of new contacts and the discussion of special security problems. Mr. Rene Carroll has a primary assignment to the Army, Mr. Morris a primary assignment to Navy and Air, but the two men serve as alternates for each other, and are aided in the reading panel work by Mr. Simmons.

Mr. Morris and Mr. Carroll serve alternate weekly assignments on the Army Intelligence reading panel, where another Mr. Carroll from IAD also attends and indicates items to be sent to the intelligence area of the Department. All three men are informed of their respective needs and sometimes serve for each other. The primary interest of FC's panel member is security and counter intelligence material, while the IAD panel member selects material not only of interest to IAD, but to the whole Department.

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Mr. Simmons attends daily an Army Civil Affairs Division reading panel for telegrams coming from the occupied areas, selecting those he believes to be of interest to the entire Department, bringing them back in sextuplicate and turning them over to DC/T for distribution. The C&D Information Control Office makes available for review a list of all reports from occupied areas, and the liaison officer from FC makes selections from this of reports to be sent to the entire Department.

Although Navy has no reading panel, they do send FC copies of telegrams Navy selects on security and counter-intelligence matters. It is also understood that Navy sends regular intelligence material directly to OGD and that the latter Division has a liaison officer to Navy.

It is understood that military, naval and air attache reports, while available for review by the Chief of Mission, are sent directly to Army, Navy and Air Departments, and only made available to the State Department in Washington after screening by those Departments.

The direct representation work to the military agencies, requiring much of the time of Mr. Carroll and Mr. Morris also includes operational and administrative problems not involving positive foreign intelligence. Examples are such problems as securing the use of military aircraft for mission personnel, the prevention of proposed naval maneuvers in the vicinity of certain critical areas, the hospitalization of a South American Air Attache, robbery cases and other civil crimes on the part of armed forces abroad, etc.

In the case of FBI and CIA, Mr. Lewis and Mr. Mundy, respectively, have the agency assignments but their work does not involve daily visits to the agencies or personal investigation of agency records. Instead, most of their time is spent in the Department of State securing desired information or handling the special problems brought up by those agencies. They do, of course, make some visits to agencies, establish contacts and take care of the special security problems which the Department of State must take up with those agencies and they provide the primary channel between State and these two agencies for the flow of security intelligence documents with a few exceptions.

FBI is generally interested in foreign activities because of their reflection upon United States minority groups and the consequent effect upon internal security in the United States. They also call upon the State Department for advice or assistance in connection with such cases as securing reports on draft evaders who have fled from the United States and requests from foreign governments for FBI training of their police officials. Generally, the flow of inquiries between FBI and State in either direction go through FC, at the specific request of FBI that such traffic for the entire Department be restricted to a single channel.

Mr. Lewis also serves in a liaison capacity with the Post Office Department, the Customs Service, and the Secret Service when occasion arises.

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In the case of CIA, the flow of telegrams and airgrams and despatches from State to that agency goes directly from DC/L, and not through FC. CIA material comes to FC on the basis of a selection by CIA and not on the basis of selection by a State Department representative. CIA also sends positive intelligence reports directly to IAD, to a Mr. Ingersoll, the decision and differentiation between FC and IAD interests being made by CIA.

Mr. Jessop, who heads the Administrative Section, is liaison officer to the Army security group for civil censorship in the occupied areas and to Federal Archives in connection with the records of the Office of Censorship.

IV. TRAVEL SECURITY & SECURITY EVALUATION BRANCH

The Security Evaluation Section, directed by Mr. Broecker, is presently divided into two units. One, headed by Mr. Donovan, is called the Security Evaluation Unit, and has two P-4's, two P-2's, one FSO and five clerical employees. The other, headed by Mr. Cherp, is called the Security Development Unit and has two P-4's, one P-3, two P-2's, three P-1's and five clerical employees. The 1949 budget estimate position chart shows sixteen positions assigned to the Section as a whole, but twenty-three persons are presently assigned, many of them very recently. A good many are individuals formerly employed in the Division on the project of screening German war documents.

The Security Evaluation Unit may be described briefly as having the function of answering the question, "Does a person (or organization) constitute a security risk to the United States in a given set of circumstances?" This is the single point in the Department of State to which all action units of the Department are directed (Departmental Regulation 298.1) to refer inquiries as to persons suspected of being security risks. There are about 300 such inquiries each week from within the Department, the chief inquirers being IEP, PR, PD, VD, and CSA. There are also about 300 inquiries a week from other agencies, primarily FBI, APC, MIS, ONI, and CIA.

Upon receipt of a name check request, a staff member fills out a check list indicating the sources to be checked and a typist prepares inquiry forms and sends them to the several sources (an average of nine for each name checked). Chief sources within the Department are the files of FC, PD, VD, and DC/R, and outside the Department are Army, Navy, CIA, and FBI. BI is called upon in only about 30% of the cases. When replies are received, a staff member reviews them and prepares a written summary and action recommendation, and forwards them to the work unit of the Department in which the request originated. In the case of name check inquiries originating in FBI, APC, CIA and ONI, after the FC staff member screens the material available, a liaison representative comes from the agency and reviews the material, and no summary is prepared in FC. In

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either type of case however, the Master Index of names in FC is amended to show that an inquiry was made, and sources of data noted.

This Unit also receives from the Department of Justice duplicate applications for all foreign agents registered there, secures and summarizes any security intelligence information available with respect to the persons, and forwards them to the political divisions for official comment to be transmitted from the Secretary of State to the Attorney General. This Unit also notifies United States missions abroad of the registration of these agents and the data concerning them.

Mr. English is the only Foreign Service Officer now assigned to the Division, and he has been working in the Security Evaluation Unit on name checks, organization checks and special reports, although the chart for FC indicates the only FSO assignment as being in the Office of the Chief. One report, prepared some months ago by Mr. English on the International Brigades was not released at the request of EUR on the basis that sufficient material was coming from the field. Mr. English later learned that DRE was preparing a like report, phoned a member of that Division, supplied him with a copy of the FC report, but has received neither acknowledgement nor the return of the report.

The Security Development Unit consists of a group of analysts, each with a separate geographic area assignment, who read and analyze the hundreds of reports, despatches, telegrams, airgrams, and other data secured for them from Department of State sources or through the liaison channel, discovering and noting every item covering a person, organization or situation which is now or appears likely to be subversive of or inimical to United States interest abroad. These analysts must make certain that a reference to such items is made on the "Master Index" of persons maintained by FC (used for security name checks) and they also relay to interested action units of the Department and to United States foreign missions any critically important information. Further, they prepare occasional spot reports on special security threats. About 60% of the source material used comes from State Department sources, one-half or more of the remainder coming from CIA, and the rest from Army, Navy, FBI, Coast Guard, Customs, Secret Service and other miscellaneous sources.

In addition, the analysts prepare a weekly selection of the more important or significant items, which are consolidated into a weekly summary report which is duplicated and circulated within CON. The analysts also interview many outgoing or returning Foreign Service personnel, providing the former with as much background information as possible on specific security problems in the area to which they are going, at the same time requesting such specific reports as are desired.

Without exception, the analysts stated that they neither received nor sent any material to EUR-X, and that their contacts were infrequent with analysts in the intelligence area who might be working on like problems. They do, however, see a periodic release listing the current and pending reports being prepared in the intelligence divisions. No such report is prepared in FC.

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One member of the group, Mr. Hammond, attends a daily reading panel in DC/R, together with representatives of IAD and Army and Navy. DC does some screening before material is referred to the panel, and the IAD and FC representatives screen it again before giving it to the Army and Navy representatives. Mr. Hammond estimates that more than half of the material he screens would not be sent to FC if there were no reading panel. Mr. Hammond also selects material on oil or petroleum to be referred to a Mr. Hoffman on the Petroleum Board.

The Travel Security Section, also directed by Mr. Broecker, has one P-5, one P-4, one P-1, one CAF-9, and four clerical employees. Although indicated on the chart as a single Section, it does not so operate, and its personnel and functional assignments are not uniform. One group of four employees headed by Mr. Cox, a P-4, performs for Germany and Austria the identical duties carried on by analysts in the Security Development Unit plus maintaining files of Nazi Party members and German and Austrian nationals repatriated from the Western Hemisphere during World War II and providing advisory opinions to the occupation governments of Germany and Austria relative to the granting of exit permits from the two countries for German and Austrian nationals. As yet the files of Nazi Party members and German and Austrian repatriates are not carded into the Master Index maintained by FC.

Another group of two employees in the Section, headed by Miss Smith, maintains the most complete file in the United States on Japanese and Nisei, and all cases involving the travel of such persons are checked here, as well as any security name check case. The work goes beyond simple file maintenance and searching, the person in charge being expert in the language, customs, family relationships and other data necessary for adequate case review.

In the remaining group in this Section, Mr. Drury is concerned with a wholly different aspect of travel security. He reviews Visa Division outgoing telegrams and gives advisory opinions as to the security risks involved in granting visas to proposed alien visitors or immigrants to the United States. Mr. Drury also provides security advice to the Visa Division with respect to cases involving visitors, students, teachers and others now living in the United States and seeking to "regularize" their status here.

In an operation having some similarity to that of the analysts in the Security Development Unit, Mr. Drury also reviews a large flow of copies of telegrams and airmails indicating the movement between countries of known subversive persons, thus discovering and proposing appropriate action in the case of apparent concentration of such persons in a particular locality.

V. ADMINISTRATIVE BRANCH

The Administrative Branch, headed by Mr. Jessop, containing twenty employees, CAF-2 to CAF-12, provides the Division with the usual personnel, budget, space, supplies and other housekeeping services, and, in addition, directs the activities of the Mail and File Units and the Telecommunications Unit.

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One part of the Mail Unit, with three clerical employees, receives and routes all telegrams, airgrams, despatches, and other material emanating from Department of State sources. Action material is carded before leaving the Unit and the outgoing response is checked off and the card destroyed. All mail routed to two or more points in FC passes through this mail room moving between points. One person is occupied full time filing cards, pulling them from files and enveloping material.

A separate part of the Mail Unit, employing two persons and occupying a separate room receives, routes and eventually files permanently classified material received from CIA, Army and Navy. Such material is usually highly classified, it is received and despatched by courier, covering invoices and receipts are used, and the greatest care is exercised in its handling and filing. The material is primarily informational in character, not "action" items.

CIA sends most of its material directly to IAD for further distribution in the Department, including FC, but in some instances sends items directly to FC. ONI sends their material directly to IAD, which forwards one copy to FC. MIS sends one copy of their material to FC and the remaining copies to IAD for further distribution in the Department.

The File Unit, with three clerical employees, maintains the Master Index of names referred to elsewhere in the report, which comprises fifty-six file drawers containing approximately 168,000 cards, filed alphabetically. A separate cross file of duplicate cards is maintained by country, of 54,000 persons in a special category. Most of the supporting data for the Index cards is on file in the operating Divisions of the Department and not in the FC File Unit.

In addition, a Kardex file record, transferred from ES, containing 500,000 names of persons and firms "black listed" during World War II is kept near the Master Index and is searched for security name checks. However, no attempt is made to keep this file current and it is estimated that in three years' time selected portions will be consolidated into the Master Index and the remainder destroyed or referred to Archives. The supporting file material for the Kardex is not maintained currently in the File Room, but is stored elsewhere.

It should be noted that there are many uncoordinated files, both in the File Unit and elsewhere in the Division, some of the larger and more important being those on Nazi Party members, Germans and Austrians repatriated from Latin America, War Relocation Authority records on Japanese and Nisei, the files in FC Telecommunications Unit and the Allocation Group of the Mail Unit, the FBI reports on Visa applicants and the censorship files.

The Telecommunication Unit, headed by Mrs. Libbey, and using five and sometimes six employees, receives from DC/T twelve copies of every in and out telegram selected by DC/T in accordance with a list provided by FC indicating the subjects which FC, Army, Navy and FBI are interested in reviewing. These copies are sorted, read, counted, recorded, routed by

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means of a very elaborate procedure, three sets being retained in FC and the remainder enveloped for the couriers who pick them up from the several agencies. Any questionable item is picked out by the reader and referred to the appropriate liaison officer for clearance before release. Less than 10% are screened out.

There is also a Coordination and Review Unit through which all outgoing documents from FC are cleared. Memos and letters to other Departments need not clear through SS/CR, so this Unit provides a like type of review, covering both clerical errors and attending to necessary clearances, both within FC and in other Divisions of the Department when necessary. An average of about fifty items a day are reviewed, of which one will be stopped from release completely, 4 - 5 will require further clearance in FC and 6 - 7 will require clearance with other Divisions and 6 - 7 should be sent to additional offices for information.

A special unit, attached directly to the Office of the Division Chief, takes care of all arrangements for military, naval or air training missions Authorized by Public Law 242 of May 1926. The United States now has thirty three such missions, most of them in Latin America, involving the assignment of about two-hundred officer personnel and a larger number of enlisted men. Mr. Anderson and one clerical employee handle this work, arranging for meetings between foreign representatives in this country and United States military officials, drawing up the bi-lingual agreements, clearing the assignment of individual officers and arranging for allowances for the personnel involved. Five new training missions are now pending, and many older ones come up for renewal and revision each year.

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Conclusions

1. There is no established uniform minimum standard of work assignment or review of security name check cases, either from the standpoint of grade level of personnel assigned nor speed of handling. The present organization affords the highest level of review and the most prompt review of security checks to visa and German exit permit cases only, although there is no evidence that they deserve such preferred handling.
2. Only an occasional security name check case is reviewed by the analysts in the Security Development Unit, yet they are the employees with the most comprehensive knowledge of the background (organizations, movements and related factors) in their respective areas.
3. It appears impractical to exercise 100% supervision over the work of the Security Development analysts, and it would be almost impossible to create written minimum standards for their product, yet the positions provided for such work are classified at low professional levels and are occupied by persons presumably qualified only for those grades.
4. While there is much evidence to indicate a constant activity on the part of senior officials of FC and SA/E to develop a close co-operative relationship with the intelligence area, inadequate means have been used to indoctrinate lower level employees of FC on this point, so that there is a real lack of close working relationship between analysts in the Security Development Unit and the employees in the intelligence area.
5. Formal working arrangements between FC and EUR-X are completely non-existent, and there is no flow of information or data between the two. The only exception is the occasional telephone call made to EUR-X by one of the four FC employees who have a personal acquaintance with Mr. Murphy as the result of years of service in the Department. Consequently FC reports are incomplete with respect to any data available exclusively in EUR-X.
6. Inter-departmental liaison assignments are split into three sections and a special unit attached to the Office of the Chief, relations with the Army involving three of the four units, the Armed Agency Section, the Administrative Section, and the office of one Chief.
7. The security intelligence files are now so scattered and decentralized in FC that it presents a difficult, if not impossible task to be certain that all source material is obtained and reviewed in making any specific study or report.

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8. The procedures in the Telecommunications Unit are too elaborate and complex, involving repeated sortings and countings and requiring the services of five persons to handle an average of only 300 messages a day.

9. Receipt, despatch, and the internal routing and distribution of telegrams, airmails, letters and despatches is now scattered in three units.


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Appendix 2
Division of Foreign Activity Correlation
Staff Assignments
December, 1947



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DEPARTMENT OF STATE INT 758/70

SION OF FOREIGN ACTIVITY CORRELATION

September 1, 1947

ASSISTANT CHIEF IN CHARGE OF TRAVEL SECURITY AND SECURITY EVALUATION				
Assistant Chief of Division	1	P-6		\$7,102
Senior Divisional Assistant	1	PSO		
Clerk-Stenographer	1	CAF-4		2,394

SECTION		SECURITY EVALUATION SECTION				
P-5	\$6,115	Chief of Section	1	P-5		\$5,905
P-4	4,902	Intelligence Officer	4	P-4		29,859
P-4	4,902	Divisional Assistant	1	P-4		5,153
P-2	3,397	Divisional Assistant	2	P-2		7,171
CAF-9	4,400	Divisional Assistant	2	P-1		5,290
CAF-4	2,469	Clerk	1	CAF-6		3,021
CAF-4	2,469	Clerk-Stenographer	2	CAF-4		5,164
CAF-3	2,394	Clerk-Typist	2	CAF-3		4,336
		Clerk	1	CAF-3		2,620

DIVISION OF FOREIGN ACTIVITY CORRELATION	Departmental		FBO
	Number	Annual Salary	
Appropriated, 1948	68	\$245,374	0
Requested, 1948	66	237,744	0
Filled, July 31, 1947	68	236,998	0
(*Dumetee now positions requested)			

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3,312
1,896

OFFICE OF THE CHIEF

Chief of Division	1	P-8	\$9,975
Senior Divisional Assistant	1	FBO	
Administrative Assistant	1	CAP-6	3,116

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DIVI

NO ADMINISTRATION

\$7,102
2,695

ADMINISTRATIVE SECTION

Special Assistant	1	CAP-12	\$5,905
Administrative Assistant	1	CAP-7	3,648
Chief of Unit	1	CAP-7	3,397
Clerk-Stenographer	1	CAP-5	2,168

TRAINING SECURITY

Chief of Section	1
Divisional Assistant	1
Intelligence Officer	1
Divisional Assistant	1
Divisional Assistant	1
Mail and File Clerk	1
Clerk	1
Clerk-Stenographer	1

MAIL AND FILES UNIT

Clerk	1	CAP-6	\$3,397
Clerk	2	CAP-4	4,863
Clerk	3	CAP-3	7,031
Clerk-Typist	5	CAP-3	11,292

TELECOMMUNICATIONS UNIT

Chief of Unit	1	CAP-7	\$3,397
Release Clerk	3	CAP-5	8,311
Clerk	1	CAP-5	2,770
Clerk	1	CAP-4	2,695

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SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE CHIEF

Special Assistant	1	P-6
Clerk-Stenographer	1	CAF-5

ASSISTANT CHIEF IN CHARGE OF DIVISION

Assistant Chief of Division	1
Secretary	1

AGED SERVICES SECTION

Divisional Assistant	2	P-4	\$9,804
Divisional Assistant	1	P-2	3,397
Clerk-Stenographer	2	CAF-4	4,863
Clerk	1	CAF-3	2,244

CIVILIAN AGENCIES SECTION

Senior Divisional Assistant	2	P-5	\$13,810
Divisional Assistant	1	P-3	4,330
Divisional Assistant	1	P-1	2,643
Mail and File Clerk	2	CAF-4	5,510
Clerk-Typist	1	CAF-3	2,168

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STAFF TO THE CHIEF

ies in connection with estab-
les military, naval and air
as matters pertaining to main-
en of such missions.

CHARGE OF TRAVEL
BY EVALUATIONS

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travel of Japanese and
pective countries who may
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ligence material coming in-
is the acquisition of
proper distribution
to other interested
ies current counter-intelli-
vided to political desks an-
ent agencies and also to
it's missions abroad.

SECURITY EVALUATION SECTION

Acts as the focal point within the Office of
Controls on all security information; handles all re-
quests for information of a security nature on persons
or organizations; disseminates such information from
within the Department to outside agencies and obtains
such information from the outside intelligence and in-
vestigative agencies with which the Division has
regular liaison and disseminates it within the Depart-
ment; scans all counter-intelligence material coming
into the Department for information pertinent to the
Division's security work; develops files and indices
on such information; makes spot reports on current
security problems; provides representatives on the
Department Reading Panel to select all incoming counter-
intelligence information; acts as the Department's
channel of contact in the Department of Justice in
discharging the Department's responsibilities under the
Foreign Agents Registration Act; maintains security
information checks on persons registered under the
Foreign Agents Registration Act; provides this infor-
mation to the Secretary for his comments in accord-
ance with the Act; maintains files on foreign agents
or persons registered under the Act.

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Is responsible for formulation of policy for the operation and supervision of the Division; is responsible for the close contact between this Division and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Central Intelligence Agency and other security investigative and intelligence agencies on matters of policy, as this Division is the liaison office in the Department with these agencies on security matters; handles policy dealing with subversive elements inimical to the interests of the United States outside of this country; executes special assignments as directed by confidential instructions from the Secretary of State.

SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE CHIEF

Has responsibilities in connection with establishment of United States military, naval and air missions abroad; handles matters pertaining to maintenance and compensation of such missions.

ASSISTANT CHIEF IN CHARGE OF TRAVEL SECURITY AND SECURITY EVALUATIONS

Supervises the work of the travel security section in connection with the travel of Japanese and Germans to or from their respective countries who may be a threat to the security of the United States; has direct responsibility for the coordination and dissemination of counter-intelligence material coming in to the Department; supervises the acquisition of security information and its proper distribution throughout the Department and to other interested government agencies; initiates current counter-intelligence spot reports to be provided to political desks and other interested government agencies and also to be provided to the Department's missions abroad.

TRAVEL SECTION

responsibility for all personnel visits, including liaison with and recruitment, hiring and al; supervises routine administration of the various branches of the normal business procedure such as ordering of supplies, etc.; al records of the Division. in-leave reports charts, etc.; over- procedure for filing and carding; ing memoranda, telegrams, in- 2., to make sure that proper within the Division and that to the standard established in Correspondence Handbook and

TRAVEL SECURITY SECTION

Maintains close contact with all travel security units of the Government and reviews for security records pertaining to persons applying for entry into and exit from the United States; makes recommendations for the Department on the basis of all information available on such cases; maintains program for security control of those German and Japanese nationals traveling to and from their respective countries who may be a threat to the security of the United States; conducts all transactions for the Department involved in carrying out the provisions of the Tripartite Agreement for control of travel by Germans; also maintains the Department's extensive files on Americans of Japanese origin.

Ante 1. Controls on requests for or organic within the such in- investigative regular 14- ment; scans into the 2- Division's on such 1- security 2- Department 2- intelligence channel of 2- discharging Foreign 2- information Foreign 2- mation to 2- ance with 2- or persons 2

MAIL AND FILES UNIT

coming mail and routing of such within e responsible for routing of outgoing the proper maintenance of records on cret correspondence; maintains a tally cords of incoming and outgoing mail; ler deliveries; maintains central index outgoing material; maintains card files and maintains the central files of the ch counter-intelligence information is such information readily available to of the Department.

TELECOMMUNICATIONS UNIT

specialized administrative tasks in a the receipt of telegrams and air- line records on the release of top ret telegrams and aigrams to other les the proper routing of such com- maintains records of release of such ditions to other government agencies; al handling for officers of the Division requiring immediate action.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF FOREIGN ACTIVITY CORRELATION

September 1, 1947

ASSISTANT CHIEF IN CHARGE OF LIAISON AND ADMINISTRATION

Directs the operation of all liaison functions of the Division, including liaison with Federal Bureau of Investigation, Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Naval Intelligence, Military Intelligence Division, Bureau of Customs, Coast Guard Intelligence and Secret and Navy Departments on a wide variety of subjects of mutual interest; supervises the administrative work within the Division including liaison with Division of Personnel on recruitment of personnel, selection and assignments for the personnel, supervises administrative procedures for the various branches of the Division.

ARMED SERVICES SECTION

Releases under discretionary authority for the use of the War and Navy Departments information coming into the Department pertaining to matters of security interest; obtains for the use of the Department similar highly classified material on security and counter-intelligence from the War and Navy Departments and their representatives abroad; serves as representative of the Department on Military Intelligence Division Reading Panel; selects communications and other documents on this reading panel for distribution within the Department.

ADMINISTRATIVE

Has immediate responsibility for all administrative matters within the Division; Division of Personnel -- assignment of personnel; administrative procedures for the Division; takes care of correspondence of the Division; maintains the personnel including work reports; executes the established procedures; coordinates all outgoing instructions, notes, etc., routing has been made with the material conforms to the State Department Civil Security Manual.

CIVILIAN AGENCIES SECTION

Maintains daily contact with representatives of the Federal Bureau of Investigation on security matters; supervises all inquiries to and from the Federal Bureau of Investigation for information on a case basis; acts as focal point in the Department with the Federal Bureau of Investigation on counter-intelligence matters; provides necessary distribution of incoming and outgoing information from Federal Bureau of Investigation within the Department; also maintains contact for the Department with Central Intelligence Agency on matters of mutual security interest; assists Central Intelligence Agency in the execution of certain orders based on instructions of the Director of Central Intelligence Agency and the Secretary of State; assures proper distribution within the Division of incoming communications of a counter-espionage nature from Central Intelligence Agency; disseminates from local and foreign departmental sources information of interest and current value to the Secret Service, the Customs Bureau, the Coast Guard Intelligence and the Office of Censorship; obtains from these agencies for the Department information of current value and interest to the Department.

Handles incoming mail; including official top secret; desk for the section; supervises courier of incoming and outgoing for the Division; Division in which indexed; makes action officers of

Performs special connection with the Bureau. Maintains secret and secret agencies; handles communications; provides special for telegram

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Definition of Security Intelligence

A security intelligence program should be a considered review of activities and techniques, carried out by covert means, including sabotage and espionage, which are engaged in, employed, initiated, directed or used by an individual, agency or government, operating outside the United States, against the government, institutions or interests of the United States, or dedicated to influencing others against the United States, its institutions or interests. Information concerning such activities and techniques which are carried out by official, quasi-official or other overt means are, therefore, not within the scope of a security intelligence program.

The program should consist of the collection, coordination, and evaluation of the activities and techniques, which are within its scope. It should also include the proper dissemination of security information, with recommendations, for policy decisions based on the information so developed.

As an integral part of the program, the security intelligence organization of the Department should evaluate the degree to which groups or individuals operating covertly abroad constitute a danger to the security of the United States. A necessary corollary of this should be the analysis of the extent of infiltration by such individuals or groups into governments, labor unions, newspapers, radios, et cetera, in other countries.

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September 13, 1947

FC's Informational Needs

The following are subjects of information essential to FC's liaison with OSI and AES:

Disloyal Americans
Subversive and other agents
Intelligence matters
Espionage and counter-espionage
Security matters at our Missions
Sabotage
Police training, requests for
Clandestine operations
Clandestine radio
Foreign penetration
Nationalism
Nazism, Fascism, Communism, Spanish Falange, Japanese, etc.
Japanese and German archives
United States Government officers and employees abroad -
all FBI, War and Navy personnel (reports other than routine)
Foreign Government officers and employees
Censorship
Safehaven, political and economic
Movement of Axis technicians
Political and economic matters on all countries
Revolutionary activities and uprisings
Flight of capital, copyrights, patents, etc. - Japanese and
German
Post-war intelligence security data
Propaganda information
Biographic data
Aviation
Repatriation
Movement of internees and detainees
Visas
Exit and reentry permit matters
Passports
Recognition of Foreign Diplomatic and Consular officers
Cultural relation matters including non-citizen visitors to
the United States, exchange students, etc.

Shipping matters -

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Shipping matters - arrival and departure of foreign merchant vessels, sailings, masters, general sailing, routing instructions and charters

Diplomatic couriers - Foreign

Establishment, maintenance, changes in and personnel of the United States military, military aviation, naval, and naval aviation missions to other countries and all matters relating to additional compensation and allowances connected therewith

Establishment, maintenance, changes in and personnel of foreign military, military aviation, naval, and naval aviation missions in the United States

Foreign students entering United States military and naval academies and other service schools or units

Assignment of foreign military and naval attaches, liaison officers, observers, advisers, shipping observers and the like, opening and closing of foreign military and naval liaison and observer's offices

Transportation details, priorities, etc., in connection with the foregoing

Foreign nationals serving in the United States Armed Forces
Permission for foreigners to visit plants and factories in the United States

Staff conversations concerning the other American Republics
Army and Navy-State liaison matters - military and naval bases; air fields, aerial surveys, supplying military and naval equipment to foreign countries; requests for army or navy equipment at foreign service offices; courier and pouch services rendered by army or navy; White House and State correspondence of interest to the army or navy; etc.

All matters relating to civil and military or occupation forces and governments; also foreign relief

All matters relating to Lend-Lease and surplus property, stockpiles, and standards of subsistence (also reverse Lend-Lease)

All matters relating to refugees, displaced persons and discharged enemy soldiers

All notices of American citizens regarding Germany, Russia or Russian-dominated territories

Efficiency reports on military and naval attaches and naval and military observers abroad

Geographic reports and all related matters

Geographic reports and charts
Officers to mariners

The following are subjects of information essential to JCS's liaison with the JCS and JCS:

Information concerning individuals engaged in subversive activities, including American citizens, in the United States and abroad

Information

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Information concerning travel or proposed travel to the United States of individuals and groups of individuals who may be expected to engage in subversive activities or espionage. This would include persons who have been in the Soviet Union or in countries dominated or influenced by the Soviets.

Information indicating political and economic trends in foreign countries which might influence the activities of groups or nationals of those countries in the United States

Information indicating trends of propaganda activities of foreign powers

Biographic information of any persons who may be anti-American

Appointment or proposed appointment of foreign diplomatic or consular representatives, particularly from countries which have not consistently been pro-American in the American sense

Information pertaining to crimes committed on United States flag vessels on the high seas or in foreign ports

Information pertaining to schemes or activities which constitute fraudulent use of United States mails

Information concerning persons engaged in smuggling activities in the United States or affecting the United States

Information concerning the counterfeiting of United States currency or the use of counterfeit United States currency

Information concerning the establishment of groups or movements intending to disrupt or overthrow present governments or affecting the relations of foreign governments with the United States

The following are subjects of information essential to FBI's Travel Control program:

Movement of German nationals or dual nationals, particularly technicians or scientists, including travel involving exit from Germany or reentry into Germany

Repatriation

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Repatriation operations involving German nationals or Ausl
nationals, including both action of individuals and
activities of repatriation missions, such as the
Argentine mission, Peruvian mission, etc.

Biographical or related information concerning the heads of
foreign repatriation and immigration missions

All matters relating to refugees and displaced persons where
German nationals or former German nationals may be in-
volved in some way

Requests of foreign governments, chiefly Latin American, for
the issuance of exit permits to German nationals or
Ausl nationals

In connection with our broader responsibility of reviewing and
cataloguing security information concerning German nationals and the
German situation in general, it is necessary for the Travel Control Unit
to receive data relating to the following subjects:

Nazi resurgence: organizations, political parties, activities
of leading figures, etc.

Intelligence activities within Germany involving both German
nationals and non-German elements

Communist Party activities within Germany, and the movement
and activities of Comintern agents

Biographical data on prominent German political figures and
functionaries of the governments of the various Laender

Safehaven, political and economic

Flight of German capital, copyrights, patents, etc.

Movement of detainees and internees

General political situation in Germany

Propaganda activities of Communist or Communist-dominated
groups and/or parties

Cultural relations matters involving exchange of students, etc.

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The following are subjects of information essential to the operation of PC's secret evaluation branch because (1) PC is building its files on subjective or qualitative and individuals so that this information can be readily provided to other interested Government agencies and can be disseminated within the Department to all the interested field offices; (2) PC makes spot intelligence reports on individuals and organizations to which information is being received on an individual and/or organization to have it of great current interest to the counter-intelligence field; and (3) PC may at any time receive information from within the Department or from outside the Department for a security check on any individual or organization connected or coming into the United States or otherwise to our best interests. It is, therefore, imperative that all such types of information as listed below be rapidly routed to PC for careful handling:

- Agents of foreign governments believed to be engaged in subversive activities within or outside of the U. S.
- Foreign Agents Registration Act - operation, as posted to its relative changes, and its possible violations.
- Counter-espionage - sabotage
- Foreign penetration of United States institutions and facilities, either here or abroad
- Activities of international organizations by United States Communists or by any other persons hostile to the U. S.
- National Socialism - resurgence - Fascism, Pan-Germanism, etc.
- Political reports showing hostility toward the United States or any country on the part of persons or organizations.
- Reports or propaganda hostile to the United States - its sources, influence, area of transmission, etc.
- Counter-counter-intelligence and security data
- Full biographic data on individuals who are or may be hostile or subversive to U. S. with emphasis on political orientation

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All data on non-governmental international organizations

Communist or fascist penetration - sources of income, officers, appeal, influence, propaganda media, meetings, numerical strength, etc.

All notices of American officials or other American citizens returning from Russian-controlled areas

Information on movement into and from Russian-controlled areas, particularly mass movements and reports from our missions concerning interviews with any individuals leaving Russian-controlled areas

Activities of subversive Americans abroad

Movement of Axis techniques into countries potentially or actively hostile to the United States. Hostile acts on the part of foreign governments or individuals toward American business interests or individual American citizens abroad.

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SOURCES OF INFORMATION OF
DIVISION OF FOREIGN ACTIVITY CORRELATION

Divisional Sources

- War Relocation Authority records of Japanese-Nisei.
- German file:
 - Nazi Party organizations and members outside Germany and Austria.
 - German and Austrian repatriates.
 - German and Austrian subversives outside Germany and Austria.
- Economic Security files of persons and firms on the black list - This file is not kept current - it is expected to be out of date within two years.
- Sub file of 54,000 special category cards.
- Master index file of F. C. - 16,000 items.

Departmental Sources

- Telegrams and airgrams selected by DC.
- Dispatches and reports selected by F. C. from DC reading panel.
- Biographic Information Division files (BI).
- Visa Division files (VD).
- Passport Division files (PD).
- Division of Security and Investigations files (CSA).
- Division of Communications/Research files (DC/R).

External Sources

- Material selected by F. C. from Army Intelligence reading panel.
- Telegrams selected by F.C. from Army Civil Affairs Division reading panel
- Material made available by Army Civil Affairs Division, after selection by F.C., from lists of reports from occupied areas.
- Telegrams and Reports from Navy selected by Navy on security and counter intelligence.

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- Material from FBI selected by FBI; also material in answer to specific request.
- Army Censorship Division reports.
- Microfilm of Office of Censorship in Archives.
- Treasury and its agencies, Coast Guard, Customs, Secret Service, etc.
- Post Office.
- Justice - Foreign Agent Registration information. Alien Property Custodian records.
- CIA - "DB", "SO", and "OO" reports. All reports are selected by CIA for transmittal to F.C. and the Department. F.C. is the exclusive channel for "DB" reports.
- United States Air Force.

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Description of Procedures Used in Telecommunication Section

December 12, 1947

This Unit receives from DS/T, through the Message Service, (FC messenger picks up the first trip early in the morning) 12 copies each of every incoming and outgoing telegram and airgram selected by DC/T in accordance with a list provided by FC indicating the subjects which FC, Army, Navy and FBI are interested in reviewing. In addition, this Unit receives through regular channels action telegrams referred to FC.

The following steps constitute the handling of the 12 copy telegrams:

1. The 12 copies are sorted into four sets, the first set containing one copy of each and referred to as the Reading Set, the second set containing one copy of each and referred to as the File set, the third set containing one copy of each and referred to as Mr. Neal's set, and the fourth set containing the remaining nine copies.
2. The Reading Set and the File Set are date stamped.
3. The Reading Set and File Set are sorted by post and put into numerical sequence.
4. Two clerks compare the Reading Set with the File Set.
5. Both sets are counted.
6. A clerk reads through each copy in the Reading Set and indicates the routing, including the number of copies to go to Army, Navy and the routing within FC.
7. Entries of the indicated routing, as well as the date, number, post, etc. are made in ledgers.
8. Two clerks take the ledgers and the fourth set, composed of nine copies, and distribute copies to the War, Navy and FBI in accordance with the distribution which has been entered in the ledger. Normally four copies go to War Department and four to the Navy, the remaining copy going to FBI if the router believes it should, otherwise being sent to Navy.
9. While two employees are carrying out step 7, a third employee takes the Reading File set and sorts the copies into stacks and counts them. After counting they are redistributed in accordance with the routing within the Division which has been indicated upon the face of each copy.

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10. The File set is filed in a set of file cases in this Unit, by posts and in numerical sequence and is retained for three months before burning

The copies to War, Navy and FBI are picked up by employees of those Departments; in the first two cases officer personnel, signed for and carried away by hand. The Army insists on collections at 9:30, 2:30 and 4:30. The Reading copy is routed to other persons in the Division and may or may not come back to this Unit for destruction.

One other time-consuming task is the searching for telegrams at the request of Army and Navy which they claim not to have received. If the reference is not found in the ledgers, the desks check with CS to secure copies, sometimes having to secure clearance from the action office or drafting officer before release. A high percentage of telegrams make reference to preceeding telegrams and the clerks refer to the ledger in each such instance.

The quantity received ranges from 300 to 350 items on each week day, with Mondays totalling about twice that of other days. Approximately 20 are questionable and approximately 10 are being withheld each day from War and Navy.

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Descriptive Information Covering Material Prepared
In FC

December 1, 1947

Jose Aguero, nephew of the President of Cuba. Question of failure to declare certain merchandise before Customs by Aguero. (Letter to Bureau of Customs based on Cuban Embassy note).

Felix Renato Verbeken Ghyssens, convicted German-Belgian traitor, entry into Chile with visa granted in Paris. (Airgram to Berlin asking investigation and report).

Alleged statement by FBI in Mexico re expenditures for hoof-and-mouth disease campaign which claimed that FBI was impressed with "honesty and energy" as result of investigation. (Instruction to Mexico City asking retraction and clarification).

Salvador Ocampo, Chilean Communist Senator. Results of surveillance of - conducted while Ocampo in US at request of Chilean Foreign Office. (Instruction to Santiago based on FBI report).

Gold smuggling from US to Europe. Use by Polish Embassy, Washington, of diplomatic pouch to send gold from US to Poland. (Memorandum to EE for information).

Vanko Guerguiff. Reportedly under assignment by Bulgarian Government to act as "receptionist" at Bulgarian Mission, Washington, but has disappeared. (Letter to FBI asking investigation based on statements made by a friendly member of the Bulgarian Mission).

List of suspected Yugoslav Communists. (Letter to American Vice Consul, Port Said, Egypt, letters to CIA, ONI, MID, FBI).

Louis Colovich, suspected Yugoslav Communist who apparently intends to immigrate to South America. (Instructions to Buenos Aires and Santiago).

B-17's licensed for export to France. B-17's required for photographic work in French territory. (Memorandum to Mr. Cummins with copy to Mr. Walner).

Information regarding marriage between Warren Irwin Boe, boatswain's mate first class, US Navy, to Mrs. Lilita Bowman. (Airgram to Auckland, New Zealand, stating no possibility of marriage).

Commendation by Captain Mackinnon, USN, of Mr. Frederick Hunt, American Consul at Martinique. (Letter to Navy).

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Liaison activities between the Department of the Air Force and the Division of Foreign Activity Correlation. (FC memorandum setting forth the efforts made to establish).

Request by Aviation Francaise for film of Aleutian and Alaskan air bases. (Letter to the Assistant Chief of Air-Staff-2, transmitting request).

The establishment of an American Consulate at Malta. (Letters to CIA, Navy, and Army).

Ladislav Borowiec, passport applicant. Secret CIA memorandum concerning —. (Memorandum to Mrs. Shipley, PD).

Advisability of approving the passport application executed by George Alexander Kennedy, who desires to proceed to China. (Memorandum to Mrs. Shipley, PD, setting forth the opinion of FC in this matter).

Issuance of visa to Madame Danielle Bapperen at Paris. Information furnished Paris in connection with possibility that this person has Communist connections. (Airgram to Paris).

Issuance of permits for travel from US Zone of Germany to the US Zone of Austria. Information furnished on this matter. (Letter to Miss Mary Jellinek of Middleboro, Massachusetts).

Information concerning Princess Edda von Wrede and Prince Edmund von Wrede. Request for —, and opinion re their return to Argentina. (Telegram to Buenos Aires).

Information concerning the political background of Professor Louis Cazamian, former Sorbonne scholar. (Letter to Grinnell College, Grinnell, Iowa).

Communist influence on the principal Moslem leaders. Study prepared in FC of Communist strategy in the Arab lands. (Circular instruction to certain American diplomatic and consular offices).

December 8, 1947

Pre-examination for immigration purposes of Mr. Arne Minden Aas, a Norwegian subject. (Note to the Norwegian Embassy).

Emergency and war-time legislation affecting the operations of FC. (Memorandum from FC to CON regarding).

Case of Jose Aguero violation of Customs regulations. (Letter to Bureau of Customs).

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Eugenisz Kin, suspected of being a Soviet operator in Venezuela. (Letters to the Air Force, Army, Navy, CIA, FBI, and Customs).

Unpaid hotel bill incurred by Lt. Manigian in Greece. (Instruction to Athens enclosing memorandum from the Department of the Army).

Certain reports on petroleum received from American diplomatic and consular posts. (Letter to Army-Navy Petroleum Board transmitting).

Appointment of Lt. James H. Davis as Assistant Military Attache at Praha. Supported by the Embassy at Praha. (Letter to Department of the Army).

Italian Embassy list of Italian ships for the Navy Department. (Letter to Department of the Navy transmitting).

List of Italian ships. Acknowledging receipt of from Italian Embassy. (Memo to Italian Embassy).

Release by the Department of the Army of certain aerial photography covering Guatemala. (Instruction to Guatemala City regarding).

Sale of airplanes by the Casa Trading Corporation to the Government of El Salvador. Issuance of license covering. (Notes to the Attorney General and El Salvador Embassy).

Carmen Meana, Secretary of the Coordinating Committee for the Spanish Republic. Information concerning this person. (FC memo to PD).

Travel to Brazil of Albert de Haydin and wife, of Germany. (Airgram to Rio de Janeiro and memo to PD).

The Department's policy of the denying of United States transit facilities to War Crime repatriates to Germany. (Instruction to Guatemala regarding).

German entry permits for Odoriz and wife. (Airgram to Buenos Aires).

Issuance German entry permits for Edda and Edmund von Wrede. (Airgram to Berlin).

Replacement of Major Hohn M. Turner by Major Winston S. Hey as member of the United States Military Aviation Mission to Bolivia. (Memo to Army General Staff and note to Bolivian Embassy).

December 10, 1947

Microfilm concerning Katyn Forest murders. (FC memo to EE).

Information regarding Tito Watsson Saboris, reportedly a Communist. (Instructions to Lima and San Jose).

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Departure from Ciudad Trujillo of ships in connection with the anticipated Venezuelan revolution. (Letters to Customs, FBI).

Attempt to export airplanes to Nicaragua. Involvement of Colonel Emilio Gonzalez Cervantes, Nicaraguan Military Attache in ---. (Memos to CPA, Le).

Instituto de Cultura Hispano Uruguayo and the Spanish Republican Government in Exile. (FC memo to WE).

Information on the subversive activities of a French national in the employ of the Soviet Intelligence Service, Mr. Honag Van Hiet, was. (Instructions to Paris, Saigon, and Brussels).

Information concerning the, and the officers of, the International Rescue and Relief Committee. (FC memo to GTI).

Investigation of Veste Cornelius Kylberg. (Request to Navy Department for results of -).

State Department need of cables originated by the Budget Office of the Department of the Army concerning the use of appropriated funds in the occupied areas. (FC memo to A-S).

Exit permit for Mrs. Eva Reuter. Interest of Chilean Embassy in - . (Airgram to Berlin, memo to Chilean Embassy).

Otto Sales Company proposed shipment of ammunition for use by the Siamese Government (FC memo to MD and SEA regarding).

Assignment of certain individuals as members of the United States Naval Mission to Colombia and Peru. (Two notes to Colombian Embassy, one note to Peruvian Embassy).

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